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THE POWERS OF THE MICHIGAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS COMMISSION 
Roger C. Cramton* 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 
"it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so 
many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's 
all." 
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 
IN a statewide referendum on April I, 1963, Michigan voters ap-proved by a narrow margin the revised constitution which had 
emerged from a constitutional convention held in 1961-1962. Wit-
tingly or unwittingly, the electorate created a fourth branch of 
government-the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. On January I, 
1964, when the constitution became effective, this new organ of 
government automatically came into existence, created by a self-
executing provision of the new constitution. The eight members 
of the Commission, who had previously been appointed by Governor 
Romney and confirmed by the Senate,1 assumed the powers and 
responsibilities vested in the Commission by article V, section 29 
of the revised constitution. 
Even before the Civil Rights Commission sprang into being, 
Attorney General Frank J. Kelley had issued three legal opinions 
setting forth his views on the powers and responsibilities of the 
Commission.2 The revised constitution, the Attorney General 
opined, created broad new civil rights protecting individuals from 
private discrimination on racial, religious, and ethnic grounds in 
the fields of employment, education, housing, and public accom-
modations.3 The authority to protect and enforce these rights, he 
contended, was vested in the Civil Rights Commission. Quotations 
from the Attorney General's first opinion indicate the sweep of his 
language: "[T] he new Civil Rights Commission . . . has plenary 
power within the sphere of its authority, to protect civil rights in 
the fields of employment, education, housing and public accommoda-
tions";4 " ... included within such grant [of plenary power] is the 
• Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. MICH. S. J., 72d Legis. (Reg. Sess.), No. 38, at 464 (1964). 
2. OPS. MICH. Arr'Y GEN. No. 4161 auiy 22, 1963); id., No. 4195 (Oct. 3, 1963); id., 
No. 4211 (Nov. 18, 1963). 
3. Ovs. MICH. Arr'Y GEN. No. 4161 CTuly 22, 1963) passim. 
4. Id. at 17. 
[5] 
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enforcement of civil rights to purchase, mortgage, lease or rent 
private -housing";5 "I find no authority in the Constitution under 
which the legislature could abrogate or limit in any way the power 
of the Civil Rights Commission in the fields of employment, educa-
tion, housing and public accommodations."6 
The implications of the Attorney General's generous interpreta-
tion of the Commission's responsibilities are startling. It is surprising 
to learn that Michigan, without fanfare-indeed, without being 
aware that such a dramatic change was proposed-has embodied 
enforceable restrictions on private acts of discrimination in its funda-
mental law. And it is alarming to learn that neither the legislature 
nor anyone else, except perhaps reviewing courts, can make any 
contribution to the solution of the perplexing problems of race 
relations in Michigan. If the Attorney General is to be believed, the 
enforcement of civil rights pertaining to racial, religious, and ethnic 
discrimination is now vested, free from legislative control, in a con-
stitutionally-created administrative agency; and the future role of 
the legislature in this vital area of contemporary life is limited to 
paying the Commission's bills. The formulation and implementa-
tion of social policy on one of the most important issues of modem 
society has been placed, beyond the control of the electorate, in the 
exclusive safe-keeping of the Civil Rights Commission. 
The thesis of this article is that the Attorney General has misread 
the language and actions of the constitution-makers. The Michigan 
Civil Rights Commission is an important and powerful agency of 
government which has substantial tasks to perform. But it does not 
possess the exclusive powers envisioned by the Attorney General. 
Other governmental units-the legislature, the executive, the courts, 
and the local governments-may continue to play a creative and 
positive role in fashioning a legal order that accords to every 
human being in society a reasonable opportunity to realize his 
potentialities. 
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED CONSTITUTION 
Michigan's revised constitution contains two principal provisions 
designed to protect civil rights against discrimination based on race, 
religion, color, or national origin. A general statement guaranteeing 
equal protection and enjoyment of civil rights without racial and 
ethnic discrimination is embodied in section 2 of article I, an article 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
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entitled "Declaration of Rights." In addition, section 29 of article V, 
the article dealing with the executive branch, establishes a Civil 
Rights Commission and outlines its powers and duties. The full 
text of these constitutional provisions reads as follows: 
Article I, section 2 7 
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; 
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or 
political rights or pe discriminated against in the exercise 
thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The 
legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legis-
lation." 
Article V, section 298 
"There is hereby established a civil rights commission which 
shall consist of eight persons, not more than four of whom shall 
be members of the same political party, who shall be appointed 
by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, for four-year terms not more than two of which shall 
expire in the same year. It shall be the duty of the commission in 
a manner which may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged 
discrimination against any person because of religion, race, 
color or national origin in the enj9yment of the civil rights 
guaranteed by law and by this constitution, and to secure the 
equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimina-
tion. The legislature shall provide an annual appropriation for 
the effective operation of the commission. 
"The commission shall have power, in accordance with the 
provisions of this constitution and of general laws governing 
administrative agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations for 
its own procedures, to hold hearings, administer oaths, through 
court authorization to require the attendance of witnesses and 
the submission of records, to take testimony, and to issue appro-
priate orders. The commission shall have other powers provided 
by law to carry out its purposes. Nothing contained in this sec-
tion shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to 
direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts 
of this state. 
"Appeals from final orders of the commission, including 
cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be 
tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction pro-
vided by law." 
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISIONS 
The constitutional convention of 1961-1962 was the outgrowth 
7. Hereinafter referred to as "the anti-discrimination declaration." 
8, Hereinafter referred to as "the civil rights commission provision." 
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of a long struggle for constitutional revision in Michigan. Passage 
of the so-called Gateway Amendment paved the way for submission 
of the question of general constitutional revision to the voters by 
referendum in April 1961.9 The proposal calling for a constitutional 
convention was approved by a narrow margin at the polls, and, after 
much preparatory work, delegates were nominated in a primary 
election held on July 25, 1961, and elected on September 12, 1961.10 
The Republican candidates fared very well in the election of 
"Con-Con" delegates: of the 144 delegates (one for each senate and 
house district), 99 were Republicans and 45 were Democrats.11 This 
two-to-one preponderance gave the Republicans complete control of 
the organization of the convention and its committee structure. 
Except on a few major issues, however, divisions in the convention 
did not follow party lines too closely; on many issues, such as civil 
rights, there was a broad area of agreement between the dominant 
Republican group of moderates and a substantial number of Dem-
ocrats.12 
The degree of partisanship increased, however, as the conven-
tion proceeded, particularly after George Romney, who had become 
associated in the public mind with the emerging document, an-
nounced his gubernatorial ambitions. At the end, on August 1, 1962, 
only five Democratic delegates joined 93 Republican delegates in 
voting for adoption of the final document.18 During the political 
campaign that followed, Democratic delegates, who had hailed the 
initial proposal of a constitutional provision establishing a civil 
rights commission as "protect[ing] a large segment of the population 
against a common abuse,"14 a "light of progress,"15 and "a step 
forward,"16 argued against the adoption of the revised constitution 
by the people, in part on the ground that the proposed Civil Rights 
Commmission would be weak, ineffective, and meaningless.17 
9. See the excellent treatment of developments leading to the constitutional con-
vention in STURM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN MICHIGAN 1961-1962, at 20-54 (Michigan 
Governmental Studies No. 43, 1963). 
10. Id. at 41-47. 
11, MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, WHAT THE PROPOSED NEW STATE CON-
snnJTION MEANS TO You 2 (1962), reprinted in 2 OFFICIAL REcoRD OF THE 1961 MICHI-
GAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3358 (1963) [hereinafter cited as REcoRD]. 
12, See STURM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 38-54, 102-27. 
13. 2 REcoRD 3255-81, 3300-01; STURM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 250-53, 
14. 2 RECORD 2763 (Mrs. Daisy Elliott). 
15. Id. at 2763 (Delegate Bledsoe). 
16. Id. at 2762 (Mr. Norris). 
17. E.g., Detroit Free Press, Feb. 24, 1963, p. 3-B, col. 4 (Mr. Norris); Lawyers To 
Reject the Con-Con Proposition, Why You Should Reject the Con-Con Proposition, 
p. 2, col. 2 (pamphlet circulated prior to the April 1963 election). 
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A. The Adoption of the Anti-Discrimination Provision-
Article I, Section 2 
9 
The anti-discrimination declaration of article I, section 2 of the 
revised constitution was proposed and adopted by the convention 
several months prior to serious consideration of the Civil Rights 
Commission proposal. The Committee on Declaration of Rights, Suf-
frage and Elections, composed of fifteen delegates and headed by a 
distinguished political scientist, Professor James K. Pollock of the 
University of Michigan, gave extensive consideration to various 
delegate proposals dealing with racial discrimination18 and to the 
anti-discrimination provisions of other state constitutions.19 The 
committee decided unanimously that a general declaration against 
racial and ethnic discrimination, with implementation left to the 
legislature, should be included in the constitution. Committee Pro-
posal 26, embodying the committee's views, was submitted to the 
convention on February l, 1962; it was approved without amend-
ment after extensive discussion.20 
The committee report accompanying Committee Proposal 26 
referred to the "impressive and moving testimony" of Delegate John 
Hannah, a member of the committee who was also chairman of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, and of other individuals 
who appeared before the committee.21 The committee felt that an 
anti-discrimination declaration was necessary "to protect negroes and 
other minorities against discrimination in housing, employment, 
education and the like."22 "Civil rights" were not defined in detail; 
rather, the legislature was to define their scope, limits, and sanctions. 
The report, however, did indicate areas of principal concern: "As 
Mr. Hannah stated in his paper to the committee, 'Civil rights as 
used herein means guarantees to protect against discrimination and 
segregation because of race, color, religion, ancestry or national 
origin ... .' The principal but not exclusive, areas of concern are 
equal opportunities in employment, education, housing, and public 
accommodations.''23 
Professor Pollock, in his remarks introducing the committee pro-
18. Delegate proposals 1014 (Mr. Norris), 1174 (Mr. Norris), 1216 (Mr. Norris), 1455 
(Mr. J. A. Hannah), 1921 (Mr. Downs et al.) 
19. See I RECORD 739-40. 
20, The discussion of the anti-discrimination declaration may be found in 1 REcoRD 
7!19-52. Committee Proposal 26 received unanimous approval on Feb. 2, 1962. 1 REcoRD 
760. 
21. Id. at 740. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
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posal to the convention, aptly summarized its effect: "We felt that, 
in the event we wanted to have a specific non-discrimination clause, 
it would be better to state as a general policy of the constitution that 
there shall be no discrimination based on race, religion or national 
origin in the enjoyment of political or civil rights, and that the 
legislature should have the power to enforce this by appropriate 
legislation."24 Comments by other delegates indicate that this was 
their general understanding of the anti-discrimination declaration.25 
The limited nature of the anti-discrimination declaration was 
highlighted by the attempts of the Democratic minority to substitute 
a more far-reaching proposal.26 The minority proposal contained a 
specific reference to the fields of "employment, housing, public ac-
commodations and education" as areas in which "no person shall, 
because of his race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry, be 
discriminated against .... "27 Moreover, express language made the 
prohibition applicable to private conduct. After full discussion, in 
which the differences between the two proposals were clearly indi-
cated, the convention rejected the minority proposal and unanimous-
ly adopted the majority proposal.28 
Rejection of the minority proposal carried with it the implica-
tion that the anti-discrimination provision adopted by the conven-
tion woufd have no effect on then lawful acts of private discrimina-
tion. If any doubt remained on this subject, Professor Pollock's 
explicit remarks should have dispelled them. He stated bluntly: 
" ... this is not a directly enforceable provision in regard to private 
persons ...• "29 Legislation would be required, he added, to create 
and define new civil rights and to provide sanctions for their viola-
tion. 80 
B. Evolution of the Civil Rights Commission Proposal-
Article V, Section 29 
The proposal for a constitutional provision establishing a civil 
rights commission suddenly emerged from the Committee on the 
Executive Branch as the constitutional convention went into its 
24. Id. at 741-42. 
25, See id. at 740-49 passim. 
26. Id. at 740-41. 
27. Ibid. The text of the minority anti-discrimination provision is reproduced in 1 
REcoRD 742, 
28. The minority proposal was rejected, eighty to fifty. Id. at 750. The majority 
proposal was adopted by a unanimous voice vote. Id. at 760. 
29. Id. at 742. 
30. Ibid. 
November 1964] Michigan Civil Rights Commission 11 
final-and highly political-stage.81 The committee's conclusion-to 
establish machinery for the implementation of civil rights-was 
not embodied in a committee proposal and supporting report; 
rather, it was presented to the committee of the whole as an amend-
ment to a pending, and unrelated, proposal dealing with the execu-
tive branch. Unlike the other provisions of the revised constitution, 
the civil rights commission proposal was the product, almost exclu-
sively, of discussion and debate on the floor of the convention. Thus 
the debates are unusually important to an understanding of the 
provision now embodied in article V, section 29. 
The language and features of the civil rights commission pro-
vision were worked out on the convention floor during four arduous 
days of debate.82 The initial issue, of course, was whether the con- • 
stitution should include a provision relating to a civil rights com-
mission. A small group of delegates argued that implementation of 
civil rights should be left entirely to the discretion of the legislature 
and the courts.33 A substantial majority, however, became persuaded 
that a constitutional civil rights commission provision was desirable. 
An administrative agency, unlike the courts, could use techniques 
of education, conciliation, and persuasion, as well as those of litiga-
tion.u Public enforcement machinery, it was thought, might be 
more effective than private litigation, since individuals discriminated 
against often do not have sufficient resources to vindicate their own 
rights in the courts.811 These and other considerations-including 
perhaps a political motivation to make the emerging constitution 
more attractive to minority groups-led a substantial majority of 
the delegates to the conclusion that the constitution should include 
some sort of provision relating to a civil rights commission.86 
A second major issue, discussion of which was interspersed with 
that of the first, was whether the constitutional language should 
create a civil rights commission of its own force, or should impose 
upon the legislature a duty to create such a commission within a 
specified period of time. The original proposal of the Committee 
on the Executive Branch took the latter course, requiring the legis-
!II. 2 RECORD 1921 (March 28, 1962). The political aspects of the convention are 
ably discussed in STURM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 10!1-27, 161-66, 198-99. 
!12. March 28 and 29, and April 5 and 6, 1962. Major discussion of the Civil Rights 
Commission provision may be found in 2 REcoRD 1921-51, 1976-2006, 2075-76, 2182-2200, 
2755-64, !!US. 
!Ill. See, e.g., id. at 1924-25 (Messrs. Yeager and Stevens). 
!14. See, e.g., id. at 1927-lll. 
!15. E.g., id. at 1928 (Mr. Downs). 
36. Although no formal vote was taken at the time, it appears that a consensus in 
favor of a constitutional provision relating to a civil rights commission had developed 
by the end of the first day's debate. See id. at 1950 (Mr. Norris). 
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lature to create a civil rights commission within two years after the 
adoption of the constitution; if the legislature failed to act, the 
governor was required and empowered to create tlie commission by 
executive order.37 This proposal was attacked by delegates of both 
parties: Democratic delegates argued that the legislature would fail 
to act or would create only a token agency;38 Republicans were fear-
ful that the governor might veto the legislature's action and take the 
matter into his own hands.39 Although other delegates asserted that 
bad faith on the part of the legislature and governor could not be 
assumed, sentiment gradually veered toward a self-executing pro-
vision. 
Once the convention had decided in favor of a self-executing 
provision for the creation of a civil rights commission, the powers 
to be exercised by that body-and the limitations on those powers-
became a more crucial matter. Despite a general disinclination to 
get involved in "legislative detail," the convention gradually moved 
to a more detailed statement of the Commission's composition and 
powers. How should the Commission be constituted? What func-
tions was it to perform? What minimum powers, free from legisla-
tive attack, was it to possess? What procedural safeguards should 
apply to the Commission's proceedings? What should be the scope 
of judicial review of the Commission's orders? What effect should 
the provision have on judicial remedies in the civil rights field? 
These and other issues were the subject of extended debate and 
the language adopted was an attempt to resolve them. In the reso-
lution of these issues, two considerations were foremost: first, a desire 
to protect the Commission against legislative attack or executive 
domination by clothing it with a minimum set of powers; second, a 
need to provide for flexibility and change by preserving the legis-
lature's extensive powers with respect to civil rights. The language 
of article V, section 29 reflects a balancing of these twin objectives; 
neither was sacrificed to the other. 
III. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION 
The starting point with any problem of constitutional interpreta-
tion must be the language of the instrument itself. Constitutions are 
not struck off at a moment's notice; they are carefully drafted docu-
37. The Committee proposal was submitted as an amendment adding a new sec-
tion (i) to a pending proposal, Committee Proposal 71. The text appears at 2 R.EcoRD 
1921-22. 
3B. See, e.g., id. at 1935 (Mr. Young); id. at 1939-40 (Mr. Nord). 
39. See, e.g., id. at 1925-26 (Mr. Higgs); id. at 1940 (Mr. Sterrett); id. at 1940-41 (Mr. 
Everett). 
November 1964] Michigan Civil Rights Commission 13 
ments, reflecting painstaking labor and extensive thought. The 
language in individual· provisions-and the interrelationship of 
separate provisions-is carefully selected to minimize problems of 
construction and interpretation. Therefore, constitutional language 
should be given an ordinary and natural meaning when viewed in 
its total context. Strained constructions or novel interpretations 
should be avoided unless there is no other way to make sense out 
of the document or to rationalize its parts. 
Provisions of the revised constitution that relate to civil rights 
should be approached in this manner. Although attention will be 
given to other evidence bearing on meaning-the convention de-
liberations and campaign pronouncements-the main focus in this 
section will be on the language used by the framers. 
A. The Legislature's Authority To Define and Implement the 
State's Anti-Discrimination Policy 
The anti-discrimination declaration of article I, section 2 of 
the revised constitution states the general policy of the State of 
Michigan. It begins with an equal protection clause framed in tradi-
tional language: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of 
the laws." More unusual in state constitutions is the language that 
immediately follows: "nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment 
of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the 
exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin." 
The final sentence qualifies the entire provision: "The legislature 
shall implement this section by appropriate legislation."40 
The language of article I, section 2, examined in the light of its 
history, compels two conclusions. First, denial of equal protection 
of civil rights is prohibited in language of general principle rather 
than specific commands addressed to private persons. The anti-dis-
crimination provision adopts and builds upon existing law; it does 
not purport to create or define new civil rights in areas of private 
discrimination. Second, the legislature is empowered to create and 
define the "civil rights" that it feels are deserving of protection. 
The nature and scope of these rights, and the remedies available 
for their violation, are left to legislative judgment. The role of the 
legislature in the civil rights field is to be its normal role as the 
main engine of law creation of the society. 
B. Establishment and Composition of the Civil Rights Commission 
The Commission was created by direct constitutional provision: 
"There is hereby established a civil rights commission .... " Thus 
40. MICH. CONST, art. 1, § 2. 
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the Commission, clothed with the minimum powers provided in the 
document, automatically came into existence when the constitution 
became effective on January 1, 1964. For the Commission to com-
mence operations, only two prerequisites were necessary: (1) appoint-
ment of its membership by the governor, with the consent of the 
senate; and (2) appropriation of funds sufficient for the Commission 
to undertake its responsibilities. Both prerequisites were fulfilled 
by early 1964, 41 and the Commission began its work by inheriting 
the caseload of the Fair Employment Practices Commission. 
The relatively large size of the commission, eight members ap-
pointed for staggered four-year terms, is explained by the conven-
tion's hope that the Commission would be representative of the 
larger community. The draftsmen of the proposal believed that a 
smaller commission could not contain members of minority groups 
and still be representative of the total community. As delegate John 
Hannah put it, "[I] f their work and recommendations and action 
are to be accepted by most people, it is important that a majority 
of the members be not members of minority races or groups that 
are discriminated against."42 Proposals advanced by Democratic dele-
gates for an odd-numbered commission of five members were re-
jected in favor of a larger, bipartisan commission of eight members, 
no more than four of whom may be of the same political party.48 
Democratic fears that the senate might frustrate the operation of 
the Commission by refusing to confirm gubernatorial appointees 
were answered by the constitutional definition of advice and consent 
contained in section 6 of article V, which provides that appointments 
are to be effective if the senate does not disapprove them within sixty 
session days after the date of the appointment.44 
Beyond these matters, the constitution does not dictate the organ-
ization of the Commission. The 1963 statute45 implementing the 
civil rights commission provision, however, adds a few details: 
members of the Commission are to receive compensation of twenty-
five dollars per day for their efforts, plus reimbursement for actual 
expenses;46 a quorum consists of a majority of the members, but a 
41. See MICH. H. R. J., 71st Legis. (2d Ex. Sess.), No. 13, at 300 (1963), and MICH. 
S. J., 72d Legis (Reg. Sess.), No. 38, at 464 (1964). 
42. 2 RECORD 2183. 
43. Id. at 1990-91. 
44. Id. at 1996-99; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 6. 
45. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 37.1-.9 (1964). 
46. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 37.2 (1964). Compensation is limited to a total of 80 days 
per year, placing a ceiling of two thousand dollars on the annual compensation of 
commission members. 
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majority of a quorum may deal with "ministerial matters";47 and the 
Commission is authorized to appoint a staff director48 and such 
other employees as it deems advisable, subject to civil service 
regulations.49 
C. Substantive Responsibilities of the Commission 
Although the revised constitution devotes three paragraphs to 
the Civil Rights Commission, only one sentence deals with the sub-
stantive responsibilities of the Commission: 
"It shall be the duty of the Commission in a manner which may 
be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination 
against any person because of religion, race, color or national 
origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law 
and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of 
such civil rights without such discrimination.''50 
Analysis of this long and awkward sentence reveals that the Com-
mission has two functions: (1) "to investigate" alleged racial and 
ethnic discrimination, and (2) "to secure the equal protection of 
[the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution] with-
out [ discrimination against any person because of religion, race, 
color or national origin].'' Both the investigating function and the 
implementing function are confined to one area: "alleged discrimi-
nation in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and 
by this constitution.'' And both functions are to be exercised "in a 
manner which may be prescribed by law." 
I. Authority of the legislature to prescribe the manner in which 
the Commission's responsibilities are performed. A careful reading 
of the second sentence of article V, section 29 reveals that the clause 
"in a manner which may be prescribed by law" modifies the duty 
of the Commission "to secure" as well as "to investigate." The posi-
tion of the clause, the parallelism of the sentence, and ordinary 
usage compel this conclusion. Indeed, it would be unnecessary to 
belabor the point were it not that the Attorney General, in his first 
opinion interpreting this language, suggested that the legislature's 
power to control the conduct of the Civil Rights Commission extends 
only to the Commission's investigatory function.51 Although the opin-
47. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 37.3 (1964). 
48. The staff director "shall carry on the administrative and ministerial functions 
of the commission when it is not in session and .•• shall act in such other capacities 
as the commission may direct." MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 37.5 (1964). 
49. MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 37.5 (1964). 
50. MICH. CoNsr. art. 5, § 29. 
51. This is an inference drawn from repeated statements that the legislature cannot 
limit the powers of the commission, although it may "prescribe the mode or manner 
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ion is not explicit on the matter, the Attorney General appears to read 
the sentence under consideration as if it read: "It shall be the duty 
of the commission to investigate in a manner prescribed by law ... 
and to secure .... " This is not, however, the way the constitution 
reads. The clause empowering the legislature to control the manner 
in which the Commission performs its functions precedes rather 
than follows the parallel statement of functions: "to investigate" 
and "to secure." If the draftsmen had desired to modify only one 
or the other of the functions, it would have been a simple matter 
to place the clause within one of the parallel provisions. By placing 
it after "duty" and in front of the parallel provisions, the draftsmen 
clearly stated that the legislature might prescribe the manner in 
which the Commission performs either of its responsibilities. 
The outer limits of the legislature's power under this clause are 
clear, but there is a shadmvy middle area that must await judicial 
construction. Surely the legislature cannot strip the Commission of 
the minimum powers given to it in the second paragraph of article 
V, section 29, for these powers rest on a constitutional base beyond 
the legislature's reach. On the other hand, the legislature can create 
new civil rights, define the remedies available for their violation, 
1 and dictate the procedural steps by which they may be enforced. 
At some point, the legislative prescription of procedural details may 
begin to impair the exercise of the Commission's constitutional 
powers; a question of constitutional interpretation would then be 
presented. 
2. Limitation of the Commission's authority to discriminatory 
acts which interfere with "the enjoyment of the civil rights guaran-
teed by law and by this constitution." The Civil Rights Commission 
was not given a roving mission to solve all of the ills of modern 
society. Its jurisdiction was limited to racial, religious, and ethnic 
discrimination that interferes with the enjoyment of, or denies equal 
protection to, "the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this con-
stitution." The crucial questions, of course, are: What civil rights 
are to be free from invidious discrimination? Who is to define them? 
These questions will receive detailed consideration at a later point.152 
For the moment, I desire only to emphasize what the constitutional 
language does not say. 
The constitution does not state that the Commission should act 
to correct whatever racial and ethnic discrimination it thinks 
in which investigations are to be conducted." OPS. MicH. An'Y GEN. No. 4146, at 18 
(July 22, 1963). 
52. See part IV infra, especially the text at notes 181-93. 
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should,be eliminated. The Commission is to protect only those civil 
rights "guaranteed by law and by this constitution." Since article 
V, section 29 is an implementing provision and does not purport to 
create new rights, other provisions of the constitution must give rise 
to whatever constitutional rights and duties are enforceable under 
this provision of the revised constitution. Similarly, rights "guaran-
teed by law" must find their origin in legislative enactment or judi-
cial decision. The Civil Rights Commission cannot "investigate" or 
"secure" rights that do not exist. 
3. The investigatory function. "[T]he life blood of the admin-
istrative process," it has been said, "is the flow of fact, the gathering, 
the organization, and the analysis of evidence.''53 The informing and 
inquiring functions of government provide a reservoir of informa-
tion from which legislative recommendations, decisional rules, and 
public enlightenment may flow. The investigatory function of the 
Civil Rights Commission, viewed in conjunction with the subpoena 
power contained in the second paragraph, encompasses the broad 
range of inquiring and informing activities: study, report, discus-
sion, persuasion, publicity. 
It is not clear whether the Commission's investigatory powers 
are broader than its enforcement functions. However, it would seem 
that the existence of private rights of nondiscrimination is a prere-
quisite to investigatory as well as to adjudicatory action by the Com-
mission. The 1963 statute implementing article V, section 29 appears 
to take the same position since it authorizes compulsory process, 
through court authorization, "relating to matters under investiga-
tion or in question before the commission.''54 
4. The enforcement function. The Commission's second re-
sponsibility is "to secure [in a manner prescribed by law] the equal 
protection of civil rights [guaranteed by law and by this constitu-
tion] without discrimination [against any person because of religion, 
race, color or national origin]." The verb "secure" has a number of 
meanings, depending on the context, but only a few are relevant 
here: "to relieve from exposure to danger; to put beyond hazard 
of losing or of not receiving; to bring about: effect, produce."55 The 
common ground shared by these definitions indicates that the Com-
53. JAFFE 8e NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 491 (2d ed. 1961). The investigative 
functioru of the Civil Rights Commission should be compared to the legislative in-
vestigation, the grand jury inquiry, and the analogous informing and educating func-
tions of executive officers and other administrative agencies. 
54. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 37.5 (1964). 
55. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2053 (1963). 
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mission is to bring about, or to prevent from loss, the r~hts of 
individuals to be free from invidious racial, religious, and ethnic 
discrimination. The nature and scope of these rights and duties 
must be found in some authoritative source. The Commission's 
£unction is to implement and to enforce rights elsewhere created-
a very substantial job indeed but not an unlimited power to make 
law. 
Usually the remedial sanctions (criminal penalties, fines, injunc-
tive relief, money damages, etc.) available to an administrative 
agency will be specified in the enactment creating the rights and im-
posing the duties. In the absence of a remedial framework the Com-
mission is powerless to do anything other than investigate, concili-
ate, and report. 
The convention journal reveals that there was general agree-
ment that the principal techniques of enforcement were to be in-
formal rather than formal. 56 The choice of an administrative agency, 
rather than a court, was due to a belief that conciliation, education, 
and persuasion would be more effective than formal sanctions in 
the sensitive area of race relations.57 As an influential group of dele-
gates later stated in a public document: "Taking its cue from the 
experience of the Fair Employment Practices Commission the Con-
vention believed that the greatest usefulness of the Civil Rights 
Commission will be in informal negotiation, conciliation and edu-
·cation, and that resort to the courts or even to formal commission 
hearings will be rare."58 
D. Procedural Powers of the Commission 
Article V, section 29 is self-executing in two important respects: 
(1) the Civil Rights Commission was created by direct constitutional 
provision; and (2) the Commission was clothed with a minimum set 
of powers. Two sentences in the second paragraph of section 29 
enumerate the Commission's minimum set of powers and the con-
stitutional limitations on their use: 
"The commission shall have power, in accordance with the pro-
visions of this constitution and of general laws governing admin-
istrative agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations for its 
56. See, e.g., 2 REcoRD 1927-28 (Mr. Downs); id. at 1928-29 (Mr. Baginski); id. at 1929-
31 (Messrs. Dade, Hannah, and Stevens). But a proposal designed to limit the Civil 
Rights Commission to informal functions of investigation and conciliation was defeated. 
Id. at 1945. 
57. Id. at 1927-31, 1941-45. 
58. Delegates Pollock, J. A. Hannah, Cudlip, Mosier, Lawrence, Cushman, Judd, 
Martin &: McCauley, Your Individual Rights in the New Constitution 4-5 (undated 
brochure circulated prior to April 1963 election). 
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own procedures, to hold hearings, administer oaths, through 
court authorization to require the attendance of witnesses and 
the submission of records, to take testimony, and to issue appro-
priate orders. The commission shall have other powers provided 
by law to carry out its purposes.''69 
' I. Constitutional and statutory safeguards. All powers of the 
Civil Rights Commission must be exercised "in accordance with 
the provisions of this constitution and of general laws governing 
administrative agencies." Three provisions of the revised constitu-
tion provide procedural safeguards against action of the Commission: 
Article I, section 17, in addition to a traditional due process 
clause, provides: "The right of all individuals, firms, corporations 
and voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the course 
of legislative and executive investigations and hearings shall not be 
infringed.''60 Since the Civil Rights Commission is part of the execu-
tive branch of government, this provision is applicable to it. 
Article IV, section 37 permits the legislature to establish a joint 
committee to act between sessions and to suspend until the end of 
the next regular legislative session any rule or regulation of an 
administrative agency promulgated when the legislature is not in 
regular session.61 Attorney General Kelley has ruled that "this legis-
lative power would not be applicable to a constitutional body such 
as the Civil Rights Commission, which is a constitutional authority 
serving in the executive branch of the government.''62 With all 
deference, this view is patently erroneous. It is impossible to ignore 
the constitutional language that requires the Commission to act 
only "in accordance with the provisions of this constitution . . . 
governing administrative agencies." If the language were unclear, 
which it is not, the convention deliberations reveal that everyone 
understood that the constitutional and statutory provisions concern-
ing legislative suspension and review of administrative rules were 
applicable to the Commission.63 This understanding was also mani-
fested in the political campaign that preceded adoption of the 
revised constitution.64 For example, a pamphlet widely distributed 
59. MICH. CoNsr. art. 5, § 29. 
60. MICH. CoNsr. art. 1, § 17. 
61. MICH. CoNsr. art. 4, § '!,7. 
62. OPS. MICH. An'y GEN. No. 4146, at 19 ijuly 22, 1963). 
6'!,. See, e.g., 2 REcoRD 1927, 1989 (Mrs. Judd); id. at 1945 (Mr. Everett); id. at 1995 
(Mr. Martin); id. at 2182 (Mr. Van Dusen); id. at 2186 (Mr. Austin); id. at 2192 (Mr. 
Ford). The only contrary statements were in terrorem arguments made in support of 
weakening amendments; e.g., id. at 1941 (Mr. Boothby). 
64. E.g., Ann Arbor News, March 7, 1962, p. 6, col. 4 (one objection to Civil Rights 
Commission provision is that the Commission's rules would be subject to legislative 
suspension). 
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by the Citizens for Sound Government, an organization which op-
posed the constitution, argued that "work of agencies dealing with 
basic civil rights of the individual would be hamstrung by the Legis-
lature. (The proposed Constitution empowers the Legislature to 
suspend rules which th,e agencies need to carry on their work of 
guaranteeing equality of treatment under the law.)"65 
Article VI, section 28 provides for extensive judicial review of 
decisions of "any administrative officer or agency existing under 
the constitution or by law."66 Although this provision is largely dis-
placed insofar as the Civil Rights Commission is concerned by the 
more specific judicial review provisions of the third paragraph of 
article V, section 29, it is otherwise applicable to the Commission. 
The Commission must also exercise its powers "in accordance 
with the provisions . . . of general laws governing administrative 
agencies." Thus, existing and future statutes imposing general pro-
cedural requirements on administrative agencies are automatically 
applicable to the Civil Rights Commission. Delegate Van Dusen, in 
explaining the provisions of the substitute proposal that was 
adopted by the convention, stated that existing statutes which would 
"automatically apply" to the Commission "are the administrative 
code act and the administrative procedure act adopted by the legis-
lature to guarantee due process in the conduct of the affairs of all 
administrative agencies of the state.''67 The Administrative Code 
Act68 provides for publication and legislative review of rules promul-
gated by state agencies; the Michigan Administrative Procedure 
Act69 imposes procedural requirements on the issuance of rules and 
the conduct of formal proceedings. 
2. Rulemaking powers of the Commission. The Commission is 
given power, subject to the limitations noted above, "to promulgate 
rules and regulations for its own procedures . . . .'' Limitation of 
this power to procedural rules and the absence of any grant of sub-
stantive rulemaking authority provide strong evidence that the Com-
mission was not given legislative power to establish general standards 
to govern private conduct in the civil rights area. The convention 
journal eliminates any lingering doubts. 
65. The Citizens for Sound Government, Those Who Know Vote "No" (unpaginated 
flyer, 1962). See also the flat assertion of Harold Norris in a newspaper article on the 
"weaknesses" of the Civil Rights Commission provision: ''.Power is granted to a legisla-
tive committee to suspend rules of administrative bodies. This will render ineffective 
such rules as 'Rule 9' and weaken the authority and initiative of the commission." 
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 24, 1963, p. 3-B, col. 4. 
66. MICH. CoNsr. art. 6, § 28. 
67. 2 RECORD 2182. 
68. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 24.71-.82 (1964). 
69. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 24.101-.ll0 (Supp. 1961). 
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The initial proposals that spelled out the constitutional powers 
of the proposed self-executing commission included a general grant 
of "power to promulgate rules and regulations."70 When the Repub-
lican majority substituted the proposal that was ultimately adopted 
by the convention, the limiting words "for its own procedures" were 
added.71 Delegate Van Dusen took pains to point out that the sub-
stitute specified "that the rulemaking power of the commission is 
the power to promulgate rules and regulations for its own proce-
dures"; he then called on delegate John Hannah to comment on 
"2 or 3 aspects of the proposed substitute which resulted from his 
experience as chairman of the federal civil rights commission, 
particularly the limitation of the rulemaking power to the rules 
and regulations for the procedures of the commission. . . ."72 Mr. 
Hannah replied: 
"The next point that Mr. Van Dusen has raised is the one that 
gives the commission the power to make rules, and I was a little 
concerned by the wording. Certainly they must make rules for 
their own operations. . . . I am concerned because of some of 
the experiences that I have had in the . . . federal civil rights 
commission. The commissioners, I am sure, here, would be 
generally fair and objective in operating in the public interest; 
but there is a tendency, always, on the part of staff people, the 
full time employees, to sometimes forget the public interest and 
they are inclined to throw their weight around, sometimes to 
the embarrassment of the commissioners, and the commissioners 
find themselves, finally, the tools of their employees. I think 
that the change in language here is a distinct improvement."73 
Thus the purpose of the change was to limit the powers of the 
Commission. In the absence of legislation delegating substantive 
rulemaking authority to the Commission, it lacks power to issue 
binding rules and regulations governing private conduct. 
3. Adjudicatory powers of the Commission. The constitution 
gives the Commission the minimum powers necessary to adjudicate 
formal proceedings: it may hold hearings, administer oaths, and 
take testimony; through court authorization it may require attend-
ance of witnesses and submission of records; and it may issue "ap-
propriate orders." These traditional powers of administrative tri-
70. The Austin substitute, offered by Messrs. Norris and Nord, was the first proposal 
to enumerate the minimum powers of the Commission. It contained the language 
quoted in the text. 2 REooRD 1982. 
71, Id. at 2182. 
72. Id. at 218!1. 
7!1. Ibid. It should be noted that a subsequent attempt proposed by Mr. Young to 
delete the word! "for its own procedures,'' leaving the Commission with a general rule-
making power, was defeated. Id. at 2197. 
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bunals may not be eliminated, although they may be channeled, by 
statute. There was little discussion of what constitutes an "appro-
priate order," but it appears that the cease and desist order was con-
templated. Reference to cease and desist orders in the sentence 
governing judicial review of commission orders reinforces this view. 
There is no indication that the Commission was to have any author-
ity to award money judgments or to exact penalties; moreover, these 
more unusual powers should not be presumed to be given in the 
absence of an express grant. 
4. Legislative authority to give additional powers to the Com-
mission. The second sentence of the second paragraph of article V, 
section 29 provides: "The commission shall have other powers pro-
vided by law to carry out its purposes." Throughout the conven-
tion's consideration of the civil rights commission proposal, it was 
recognized that the legislature would need to implement the pro-
vision by filling in details and adding such other powers as would be 
found necessary.74 As delegate John Martin put it: "This is the 
barest kind of bones of authority to operate. It does not specify 
how, and it would undoubtedly fall to the legislature to implement 
this with legislation, filling in gaps as to what needed to be done."75 
Ultimately, in an attempt to leave no doubt that the legislature 
could and must implement the enforcement of civil rights by the 
Commission, three separate provisions were included in article V, 
section 29: (I) the legislature may prescribe the manner in which 
the Commission performs its constitutional duties (first paragraph, 
second sentence); (2) the Commission's powers must be exercised 
in accordance with constitutional provisions and general statutes 
governing administrative agencies (second paragraph, first sentence); 
and (3) the legislature is authorized to provide the Commission with 
additional powers consistent with its purposes (second paragraph, 
second sentence). 
E. Relationship of the Commission to the Courts 
I. No displacement of judicial remedies. The third sentence of 
the second paragraph of article V, section 29 provides: "Nothing 
contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right 
of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies 
in th~ courts of this state." This sentence, referred to as the "judi-
74. See, e.g., the discussion leading to inclusion of the language authorizing the 
legislature to prescribe the manner in which the Commission performs its functions. Id. 
at 1935-38, 1992-95. 
75. Id. at 1990. 
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cial remedies provision," was the subject of much confusion and 
debate in the convention, but its purport is reasonably clear. The 
convention did not intend to confer exclusive jurisdiction in the 
civil rights field on the Commission. Remedies in the courts, includ-
ing both those existing at the time and those subsequently created 
by legislative enactment or judicial decision, are not affected by the 
civil rights commission provision. Thus, an individual who has 
been subjected to illegal discriminatory treatment in a place of 
public accommodation may bring a damage action in the circuit 
court against the business engaged in such discrimination;76 and the 
legislature may create new civil and criminal remedies for acts of 
private discrimination and may vest jurisdiction in the courts. 
Fears were expressed in the convention that the judicial remedies 
provision would allow a respondent in a proceeding before the 
Civil Rights Commission to ignore the Commission by initiating a 
judicial proceeding. However, the principal spokesman for the civil 
rights commission provision stated that the judicial remedies clause 
would not have the effect of displacing the ordinary rule that ad-
ministrative remedies must be exhausted prior to judicial review; 
an individual against whom the Commission has proceeded may 
seek injunctive relief from threatened harm under the same prin-
ciples applicable to threatened illegal action by other administrative 
agencies.77 
In short, the Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction 
within its sphere of competence. Existing and future judicial reme-
dies are clearly preserved. 
2. De novo judicial review of Commission orders. The third 
paragraph of article V, section 29 provides: "Appeals from final orders 
of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals 
76. MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.147 (1962); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 
(1890). The discussion of the "judicial remedies" provision may be found in 2 REcoRD 
1999-2001, 2192-96, 2756-62. The debate clearly indicates that the primary intent 
was to preserve judicial jurisdiction in the civil rights field. 
77. See, e.g., the remarks of Mr. Martin: "Mr. President, it seems to me that it 
should be clear that this does not permit a defendant to take his cause elsewhere un-
less his rights are in some way being violated. He doesn't get out of dealing with the 
commission simply because he starts an action in a court. If he takes the action to a 
court, it is because his due process is being violated in some way, and if that is true, 
then he has a case. If it isn't, he has no case and he can be in court but he is also still 
involved with the commission and the commission can proceed just as it otherwise 
would. • •• The fears that are being expressed are entirely imaginary and entirely un-
necessary and the proponents of the amendments [seeking to eliminate the judicial 
remedies provision] have been frightened by ghosts which don't exist in this picture 
at all .••• " Id. at 2761. For a general discussion of the availability of injunctive relief 
against proposed administrative action, see 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 545. 
616 (1958). 
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to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court 
having jurisdiction provided by law." Disappointed complainants, as 
well as losing respondents, are given a right to a trial de novo by 
this somewhat unusual provision which was added by a voice vote 
on third reading of the civil rights commission section. Delegate 
Higgs, the proponent of the de novo review provision, explained 
that the proposed language was a digest of the more lengthy judicial 
review provisions of Michigan's Fair Employment Practices Act. 
"The words 'de novo,' of course, mean a new trial. It means that a 
person who is really aggrieved has the opportunity to re-present his 
evidence before a court of law .... "78 Only three delegates spoke to 
the Higgs amendment before it passed by a voice vote; all three 
supported it in similar terms. 
A minimum interpretation of the words "de novo,'' consistent 
with the provisions of the Fair Employment Practices Act, would 
require the reviewing court to exercise its independent judgment 
as to questions of fact, as well as law, on the record compiled before 
the Civil Rights Commission.79 The difficulty with this view is that 
findings based on the credibility of witnesses (which are very im-
portant in the resolution of discrimination cases) are made by a 
trier who has neither seen nor heard the witnesses. A broader read-
ing would require rehearing of the entire case, so that the court 
might enter its own findings of fact after hearing the witnesses. But 
this alternative involves the expense and inconvenience of a second 
trial whenever judicial review is sought. Whichever view is taken, 
the reviewing court should be limited to questions argued before 
the Civil Rights. Commission or the administrative hearing will 
become a mere charade. 
Under either view, of course, the scope of judicial review is very 
broad. The language subjecting findings and conclusions of the 
78. 2 REcoRD 3118. Mr. Higgs referred only to the judicial review provisions of the 
Fair Employment Practices Act and not to Lesniak v. FEPC, 364 Mich. 495, 111 N.W.2d 
790 (1961) (decided several months before he spoke) in which the de nova review pro-
visions of the act were held to be unconstitutional. The other three speakers, Messrs. 
Garvin, Martin, and Barthwell, also referred only to the statute and were seemingly 
unaware of the judicial reaction to it. Mr. Higgs has subsequently stated that he was 
unaware at that time that the statutory provisions upon which he modeled his amend-
ment had been invalidated by a prior judicial decision. Letter from Milton E. Higgs to 
the author, September 4, 1964. The grounds relied on by the Supreme Court in the 
Lesniak case that the de nova review provisions were an unconstitutional delegation 
of administrative powers to the courts do not survive the inclusion of the de novo 
review language in the constitution itself. 
79. Cf. M1cH. CoMP. LAws § 423.308 (Supp. 1961). The former practice on appeals in 
equity cases provides an analogy. A trial de novo, in the equity sense, is based on the 
printed record of the decision below and cannot extend to issues not before, or passed 
upon by, the lower court. See Moran v. State Banking Comm'r, 322 Mich. 230, 33 
N.W.2d 772 (1948); cf. In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280 N.W. 464 (1938). 
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Civil Rights Commission to an independent redetermination by 
reviewing courts is yet another indication that the Commission's 
powers are non-exclusive and limited. 
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF MICHIGAN R.ESIDENTS-1964 
Prior to the effectiveness of the 1963 revised constitution, the 
civil rights of Michigan residents were embodied in constitutional 
provisions and legislative enactments dating back as early as 1850. 
In that year, a reference in the 1835 constitution, so limiting the 
franchise to "white" male citizens, was eliminated.81 The 1850 con-
stitution also prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude in Michi-
gan. 82 A 1908 constitutional provision guaranteed the people "equal 
benefit, security and protection" of government.83 A final constitu-
tional provision, prohibiting "removal from or demotion in the 
state civil service ... for partisan, racial or religious considerations," 
was adopted by amendment in 1940.84 
Other civil rights relating to racial, religious, and ethnic dis-
crimination have been created by the legislature over the past 
hundred years. The first civil rights legislation was enacted in 
1867; it prohibited racial segregation in public education.85 In 1869, 
a statute prohibited life insurance companies that were doing 
business within the state from making any distinction or discrimina-
tion between white and colored persons.86 The ban against miscege-
nation was removed in 1883.87 In 1885, criminal sanctions were 
provided for denial of equal treatment in public places of accommo-
dation, amusement, and recreation; racial discrimination in the 
selection and qualification of jurors was prohibited in the same 
year.88 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the "separate but 
equal" doctrine in 1890, and held that a civil action for damages 
could be brought for discriminatory treatment in a public accom-
modation. 89 The public accommodations statute was strengthened 
in 1937,90 1952,91 and 1956;92 the 1952 amendment extended cover-
80. MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (18!!5). 
81. MICH. CoNST. art. 18, § 1 (1850). 
82. MICH. CONST. art. 18, § 11 (1850). 
8!!. MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (1908). Identical language is now art. 1, § I. 
84. MICH. CoNST. art. 6, § 22 (1940). 
85. MICH. COMP. LAws § 340.355 (Supp. 1961). 
86. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 500.2082 (Supp. 1961). 
87. MICH. COMP. LAws § 551.6 (1948). 
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.146-.148 (1948). 
89. Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890). 
90. MICH, PUB. Acrs 19!!7, No. 117, at 185-86. 
91. MICH. PuB. Acrs 1952, No. 101, at 112-1!!. 
92. MICH. PUB. Ac::rs 1956, No. 182, at 337-38. 
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age to "government housing." Finally, in 1955, the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act93 created "a civil right" in "the opportunity to 
obtain employment without discrimination because of race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry"94 and established remedies for 
the enforcement of this right.95 Domestic help and employers with 
less than eight employees were excluded from the coverage of the 
act.96 
Four provisions of the 1963 revised constitution manifest Michi-
gan's continuing concern for the protection of civil rights. The edu-
cation article contains a clause providing: "Every school district 
shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination 
as to religion, creed, rac;e, color or national origin."97 This provision, 
although duplicative of federal rights stemming from the fourteenth 
amendment,98 continues Michigan's historic legislative policy and 
"leaves no doubt as to where Michigan stands on this question."99 
A clause in the article dealing with public officers and employment 
carries forward the older constitutional prohibition of discrimina-
tion in public employment: "No appointments, promotions, demo-
tions or removals in the classified service shall be made for religious, 
racial or partisan considerations."100 This provision is also duplica-
tive of federal guarantees.101 
The two remaining constitutional provisions that deal with 
discriminatory denial of civil rights are the anti-discrimination 
declaration of article I and the civil rights commission provision of 
article V. If new civil rights were created by the revised constitu-
tion, their source must be found in the text of these two provisions. 
A. The Anti-Discrimination Declaration of Article I, Section 2 
as the Source of '!yew Civil Rights 
Article I, section 2 declares that the policy of the state is that 
"no person . . . shall . . . be discriminated against in the exercise 
[of his civil or political rights] because of religion, race, color or 
93. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 423.301-.311 (Supp. 1961). 
94. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 423.301 (Supp. 1961). 
95. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 423.304, .307 (Supp. 1961). 
96. MICH. COMP, LAws § 423.302(b)(c) (Supp. 1961). 
97. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2, 
98. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
99. MICH. COMP, LAws § 340.355 (Supp. 1961). The quotation is from MICHIGAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, WHAT THE PROPOSED NEW STATE CON5I'ITUTION MEANS TO 
You 77 (1962), reprinted in 2 REcoRD 3395. 
100. MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 5. 
101. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (summary discharge of 
teacher in a college operated by a city for refusal to answer questions before a 
congressional committee violated fourteenth amendment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183 (1952) (summary discharge of state employee on arbitrary grounds). 
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national origin." There are two major issues in the interpretation 
of this provision: (I) What application, if any, does the declaration 
have to discriminatory conduct on the part of private persons? And 
(2) what effect does the declaration have in the absence of legislative 
implementation? 
I. Scope of application of the declaration as it relates to private 
persons. The constitutional language is susceptible of two inter-
pretations. First, the declaration may merely reinforce existing 
federal guarantees against discriminatory state action which are 
embodied in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This interpretation would be in accordance with the con-
struction given to anti-discrimination declarations included in other 
states' constitutions.102 Moreover, it would prevent the declaration 
from being construed as effecting a far-reaching change in private 
legal relations.103 On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the 
language as applying only to state action, and not to private action, 
would deprive article I, section 2 of the constitution of any inde-
pendent force or effect, other than as an authorization or exhorta-
tion for legislative action in the field of civil rights. Since the legis-
lature already possesses this legislative power, the provision would be 
largely duplicative of federal guarantees established many years 
ago. 
For these reasons, I think that a more generous interpretation 
is to be preferred. Private discriminatory action that denies a 
person his "civil and political rights" should be prohibited by the 
declaration. Of course, not every legal interest is a "civil or political 
right"; the declaration does not prohibit all conduct that may be 
motivated in part by racial, religious, or ethnic distinctions. The 
discrimination must deny a previously created "civil or political 
right" before it comes within the proscription. 
2. Effect of the declaration in the absence of legislative imple-
mentation. The anti-discrimination clause is a declaration of state 
policy addressed to the legislature. It imposes a duty on the legisla-
ture to establish the civil rights deemed worthy of protection against 
racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination, to define the limits of 
these rights, and to create remedial machinery which will effectively 
enforce them. As a declaration of constitutional policy, it may have 
somewhat greater force than a mere exhortation to the legislature. 
If, for example, the legislature passed a law purporting to legitima-
tize acts of private discrimination, a reviewing court might take 
102. See text accompanying note 114 infra. 
103. See text accompanying note 130 infra. 
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cognizance of the constitutional policy in passing on the validity of 
the statute. It is one thing for the state to leave acts of private dis-
crimination untouched; it is quite another for the state to sanction 
discriminatory conduct explicitly, in the face of a contrary consti-
tutional policy. 
The evidence supporting this interpretation of the effect of the 
anti-discrimination declaration in the absence of legislative imple-
mentation may be summarized under three headings: (I) the lan-
guage and history of the constitution; (2) the interpretation of 
similar provisions in federal and state constitutions; and (3) the 
revolutionary implications of a broad and self-executing anti-dis-
crimination provision. 
a. The language and history of the anti-discrimination declara-
tion. The constitution does not purport to create an enforceable 
right to be free from all private acts of discrimination. Instead, it 
states a general po
0
1icy and provides: "The legislature shall imple-
ment this section by appropriate legislation." The establishment of 
a Civil Rights Commission elsewhere in the constitution does not 
weaken the implication that the legislature is to delimit the rights 
and remedies that will be enforced by the Commission as well as 
by other agencies of government. 
The journal of the convention contains overwhelming evidence 
that the framers did not intend to create new protections against 
private discrimination. Professor Pollock, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Rights, Suffrage and Elections, dealt explicitly with the 
question in his remarks introducing the proposal which became 
article I, section 2. 
"As a result of [the Committee's] deliberations on this matter, 
we have now come forth with a proposal which is more similar, 
I believe, to the recent Hawaiian proposal than to any other. 
We felt that, in the event we wanted to have a specific nondis-
crimination clause, it would be better to state as a general policy 
of the constitution that there shall be no discrimination based on 
race, religion or national origin in the enjoyment of political 
or civil rights, and that the legislature should have the power 
to enforce this by appropriate legislation. 
"This seemed to be the preferred type of nondiscrimination 
clause. It defines on the one hand the general policy of this state 
and also makes it clear that this is not a directly enforceable 
provision in regard to private persons, but will depend upon 
legislation which will then have to define what is meant by 
political and civil rights, the extent to which discrimination will 
be considered a violation and the appropriate sanctions to be 
applied. The majority of the committee considered this prefer-
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able, both because, as a general proposition, constitutional lim-
itations should serve to restrain governmental action and not to 
define private duties, and because the areas in which private 
discrimination should be forbidden, the extent to which dis-
crimination is prohibited, and the sanctions to be applied are 
matters that we think are appropriately left for legislation."104 
Little would be accomplished by further discussion of the con-
vention's consideration of the anti-discrimination declaration were 
it not that one aspect of the debate-the convention's rejection of 
a minority proposal referring to specific areas of discrimination-
anticipated and influenced the convention's subsequent considera-
tion of the civil rights commission proposal. Five Democratic mem-
bers of the Committee on Rights, Suffrage and Elections, led by 
Professor Norris,105 sought to substitute a more far-reaching proposal. 
This proposal contained a specific reference to the fields of "em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations and education" as areas 
in which "no person shall, because of his race, color, religion, na-
tional origin or ancestry, be discriminated against. . . ."106 The 
accompanying minority report argued that rights to equal opportu-
nity in employment, housing, public accommodations, and education 
were so fundamental in today's society that they should be declared 
in the fundamental law.107 Apparently the intent of the minority 
was to create judicially enforceable rights to be free from racial, 
religious, and ethnic discrimination in the four enumerated areas, 
without any exceptions or limitations. 
The second major feature of the minority proposal was that, 
unlike the majority proposal, it imposed a duty of non-discrimina-
tion upon private individuals and groups as well as upon public 
officials and state agencies.108 The accompanying report emphasized 
that existing equal protection and civil rights provisions in federal 
104. l RECORD 741-42. 
105. Messrs. Norris, Dade, Hodges and Buback, and Mrs. Hatcher. Id. at 740. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Id. at 740-41. See also the remarks of Mr. Norris: "The first proposition 
contained in [the substitute proposal] and not expressed adequately in the committee 
proposal is the declaration of the right of all persons to equal opportunity to secure 
employment, housing, education and public accommodations as explicit political and 
civil rights. This explicit declaration in [the minority] proposal is for the purpose of 
specificity and enforceability, and this enumeration does not connote limitation. You 
will note in Professor Pollock's statement that he felt that this ought to be left to the 
legislature. It is the submission of those who have subscribed to this report ••. that 
we ought to spell out these rights in specific form." Id. at 742. 
108. As Mr. Norris said, in explaining the minority proposal: "The second 
proposition contained in [the minority proposal] and not adequately expressed in the 
committee proposal is the imposition of a duty of nondiscrimination on private as well 
as public or state agencies in the exercise or enjoyment by all persons of political and 
civil rights." Ibid. 
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and state constitutions extended only to discrimination by public 
agencies, and not to acts of discrimination by private persons or 
groups. Under the minority proposal, private discrimination was 
proscribed when it interfered with the enjoyment by other individ-
uals of their rights to equal opportunity to secure employment, 
housing, public accommodations, and education. "[I] t is fitting and 
necessary," the report stated, "that the largest agency of discrimina-
tion, present and future, namely that of private conduct, be the 
subject matter of constitutional attention.''109 
The respective merits of the majority and minority proposals 
were then discussed at some length. Ten members of the convention 
spoke in support of each proposal. Their remarks reveal a clear un-
derstanding that the majority proposal did not create new rights or 
impose new duties in situations of private discrimination. Again 
and again it was stated that the majority proposal, unlike that of the 
minority, was not self-implementing but would require legislative 
action before it would affect private persons. Moreover, a substantial 
number of delegates either supported or attacked the majority pro-
posal on the specific ground that, unlike the minority substitute, it 
would not affect discrimination in private housing. 110 
Thus the issues were squarely posed for the delegates. Two 
proposals were placed before them: one, supported by the Republi-
can majority, did not affect private discrimination but left the 
problem for legislative solution; the other, advanced by a group of 
Democratic delegates, would have imposed a duty of nondiscrimina-
tion on all citizens. The proposals were supported and criticized on 
these precise grounds.111 The convention rejected the minority 
109. Id. at 741. . 
110. See, e.g., id. at 747-49 (remarks of Messrs. Leppien, Bentley, and Downs). 
Ill. Two illustrations will indicate the clarity with which the opposing positions 
were drawn. Delegate Murphy stated that he favored the minority proposal because 
it "covers discrimination by individuals, firms, corporations, and labor organizations. 
Individuals may be discriminated against by the state, on the one hand, or by private 
conduct on the other." Id. at 747. After explaining that present law did not provide 
protection against private discrimination, Mr. Murphy concluded: 
"I submit to you the proposition that to proscribe state discrimination while at 
the same time permitting private discrimination is to make one only half free. 
Consequently, to bring about ••• [equality], the state must bridge the gap by 
prohibiting private conduct which discriminates on the basis of race, color, 
religion or national origin." Ibid. 
Mr. Murphy concluded his statement with the argument that it would be proper for 
the state to curtail individual freedom in the use of property in order to remedy the 
social evil of discrimination and to provide those discriminated against with greater 
rights. 
Mr. Murphy's clear exposition of the difference between the majority and minority 
proposals does not stand alone. Immediately after he had finished, Mr. Leppien spoke 
in defense of the right of the individual homeowner to dispose of his property as he 
saw fit, a right which he thought would be improperly curtailed by the minority 
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proposal by a vote of eighty to fifty112 and, then, unanimously 
adopted the majority proposal,113 which became article I, section 2 
of the revised constitution. 
b. The interpretation of similar provisions in federal and state 
constitutions. The delegates at the Michigan Constitutional Con-
vention were aware that the fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution has only a limited self-executing effect. The 
amendment is self-executing in the sense that a court, in determining 
a case or entering a judgment, cannot overstep the bounds that it pro-
vides; but it is not self-executing in the sense that private rights of 
action against state officials stem directly from it. Thus a court must 
consider and apply the constitutional limits on state action con-
tained in the due process and equal protection clauses whenever, in 
a case properly before the court, the action or judgment of the 
court would itself violate these constitutional limitations.114 Other-
wise, the court would itself participate in a denial of due process 
or equal protection. On the other hand, the fourteenth amendment 
does not of its own force create broad private rights of action against 
state officials who are alleged to have violated its commands. In the 
absence of statutory implementation, an individual cannot main-
tain a damage action for violation of fourteenth amendment 
rights.m The availability of injunctive relief against official action 
is more likely, but still uncertain. Because the Federal Civil Rights 
Acts116 often provide a remedy, there has been little necessity to 
proposal. He commented that evolution was perhaps necessary in this area; an 
advantage of the majority proposal was that it "leaves the details to be expanded" by 
the legislature, which would be free "to go even beyond the restricted clauses found 
in the minority report." Ibid. 
112. Id. at 750. 
113. Id. at 760. 
114. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Enforcement cases-those in which 
the government seeks to impose civil or criminal penalties on a defending individual-
provide the typical illustration. See the illuminating discussion in Hart, The Power of 
Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1371-83 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 312, 319-25 (1953). 
115. Fisher v. City of New York, 312 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 
(1963) (claim under fourteenth amendment to recover damages for wrongful conviction 
and incarceration did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted); cf. Wheeldin 
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (unauthorized use of subpoenas by legislative investigator 
held not to violate the fourth amendment or to support a damage action); Bell v. Hood, 
71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (claim under fourth and fifth amendments to recover 
damages for wrongful search and seizure by FBI officers dismissed for failure to state a 
cause of action). Actions against state officials for money damages may also present a 
sovereign immunity problem. 
ll6. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140; 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335; Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634; Civil 
Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86. 
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determine whether the fourteenth amendment, of its own force, 
authorizes federal or state courts to grant injunctive relief against 
actual or threatened governmental action that allegedly violates 
the due process or equal protection clauses.117 
The draftsmen of the anti-discrimination declaration drew on 
the similar constitutional provisions of Hawaii, Alaska, New Jersey, 
. and New York;118 hence, the interpretation of these provisions is 
a relevant consideration. The Hawaii provision, adopted as part of 
the 1950 constitution which became effective when Hawaii was 
admitted to statehood, is most similar to the Michigan language: 
"No person shall ... be denied the enjoyment of his civil rights or 
be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, 
religion, sex, or ancestry."119 Although the provision has not been 
given a definitive judicial construction, the report accompanying its 
submission to the Hawaii Constitutional Convention indicates that 
it was intended to be a reaffirmation of the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, which "was designed to prevent a 
state from making discriminations between its own citizens .... "120 
The 1948 New Jersey Constitution contains somewhat similar 
language: "No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil 
or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of 
any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in 
the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, an-
cestry or national origin."121 Although not phrased in traditional 
language, it has been construed as an equal protection clause by the 
New Jersey court.122 New Jersey decisions hold that the provision 
prevents discriminatory state action in public housing,123 but does 
not impose judicially enforceable duties on private persons.m 
117. A quick and incomplete search has not produced a case in which injunctive 
relief against state action was predicated solely on the fourteenth amendment grounds 
without invoking federal remedies under the Civil Rights Acts or state remedies under 
state statute or common law. 
118. 1 REcoRD 740 (report accompanying Committee Proposal 26). 
119. HAWAll CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1950). 
120. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII, JOURNALS AND 
DOCUMENTS 164 (1950). 
121. N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 5. 
122. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 1 N.J. 545, 
64 A.2d 443 (1949) (exclusion of all insurance agents except "industrial life insurance 
agents" from unemployment compensation coverage held an arbitrary classification 
violating state and federal equal protection provisions). 
123. Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954) (racial segregation in 
public housing). 
124. Mills v. City of Philadelphia, 52 N.J. Super. 52, 144 A.2d 728 (1958) (testatrix's 
provision for white children upheld, although city could not administer the trust); 
cf. Rich v. Jones, 142 N.J. Eq. 215, 59 A.2d 839 (1948) (enforcing, prior to Shelley v. 
Kraemer, a restrictive covenant). 
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The New York experience is even more illuminating. The 1938 
New York Constitution contains a provision that reads in part: 
". . . No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be 
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other per-
son or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or 
any agency or subdivision of the state.''125 The minority anti-dis-
crimination provision, submitted by Mr. Norris, was modeled on this 
provision, employing very similar language. New York's anti-dis-
crimination declaration received an authoritative judicial construc-
tion in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,126 in which three Negroes 
sought an injunction against a large housing project to restrain it 
from refusing to rent apartments to them and others because of their 
race. The principal holding in the case-that a housing project re-
ceiving extensive state aid and assistance under a redevelopment 
statute is not engaged in state action within the fourteenth amend-
ment-would undoubtedly be decided differently today as a matter 
of federal law.127 A second holding, however, involved the interpre-
tation of the anti-discrimination declaration in New York's consti-
tution. After indicating that the state's equal protection clause, like 
its federal prototype, was applicable only to state action, the court 
turned to the anti-discrimination declaration: 
"The second sentence of section 11 is a civil rights clause 
and, although applicable to private persons and private corpo-
rations, protects only against 'discrimination in ... civil rights.' 
[Omission in original.] Obviously such rights are those else-
where declared. Again this conclusion is strongly supported by 
the statement of the chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee 
made at the convention to the effect that the provision in ques-
tion was not self-executing and that it was implicit that it re-
quired legislative implementation to be effective. [Citation omit-
ted.] Furthermore, it was stated at the convention that the civil 
rights protected by the clause in question were those already 
denominated as such in the Constitution itself, in the Civil 
Rights Law or in other statutes [citation omitted] .... No 
statute in New York recognizes the opportunity to acquire inter-
ests in real property as a civil right, although there are in exist-
ence today nearly twenty anti-bias laws covering many fields of 
activity ."128 
Subsequent New York cases have consistently taken the position 
125. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
126. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). 
127. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), where 
the test for state action is stated to be whether the state, to a significant extent, is 
involved in private conduct. 
128. 299 N.Y. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 548-49 (1949). 
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that extensions of civil rights under the New York anti-discrimina-
tion declaration must be by legislative enactment; and a gradual 
extension has in fact taken place.129 
The parallel to the Michigan situation-in which the chairman 
of the responsible committee made similar representations-is 
striking. Moreover, in the Michigan anti-discrimination provision, 
unlike those of New York, Hawaii, and New Jersey, the requirement 
of legislative implementation is not left to implication but is ex-
pressly included. It is noteworthy that language as broad as that 
contained in the Michigan minority proposal was held in New York 
not to create enforceable rights against private persons in the ab-
sence of legislative implementation. 
c. The revolutionary implications of a broad and self-executing 
anti-discrimination provision. If the anti-discrimination declaration 
were to be construed as placing enforceable duties on all persons 
not to discriminate in their relations with other persons, a funda-
mental change in the legal order would be accomplished. The con-
stitutional language is without limits, and, if the ban extends to pri-
vate acts that interfere with the enjoyment of legally protected 
interests of others, it brooks no exceptions. Domestic help, private 
associations, sororities at private universities, the single roomer in 
a private home-discrimination in these and other sensitive situa-
tions would be proscribed, and private rights of association would 
be severely constricted. Nor could the legislature modify or reduce 
the constitutional command by marking out exceptions. 
"Not lightly vacated," Judge Cardozo said, "is the verdict of 
quiescent years."130 Traditional patterns of legal relations or a long-
standing custom can be overthrown by abrupt innovation, but a 
strong justification is required. "If a thing has been practised for 
two hundred years by common consent," said Mr. Justice Holmes in 
applying the fourteenth amendment to a challenged state statute, 
"it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect 
it .... "131 Constitutional language will not be read to accomplish 
129. The development of New York law in the housing area may be traced in 
Kates v. Lefkowitz, 28 Misc. 2d 210, 216 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1961); State Comm'n 
Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, IO Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 
(Sup. Ct. 1958); and Globerman v. Grand Cent. Parkway Gardens, Il5 N.Y.S.2d 757 
(Sup. Ct. 1952), afj'd, 281 App. Div. 820, ll8 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953). 
130. Coler v. Com Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928) (long-
standing statutory procedure for seizure of property of absconding husband or father 
upheld against due process attack). 
131. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (state statute providing for 
damages to owners of a party wall only upon proof of negligence held not violative of 
due process). 
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fundamental changes in the legal order unless the language, viewed 
in its context, calls for such a result.132 In Minor v. Happersett,188 
wherein it was held that the definition of citizenship in the four-
teenth amendment did not impliedly grant women the right to vote, 
Mr. Chief Justice Waite relied on this "policy of clear statement": 
"In this condition of the law in respect to suffrage in the several 
States it cannot for a moment be doubted that if it had been intended 
to make all citizens of the United States voters, the framers of 
the Constitution would not have left it to implication. So important 
a change in the condition of citizenship as it actually existed, if 
intended, would have been expressly declared."134 
The anti-discrimination provision of article I does not spell out 
an intent to make an abrupt change in the legal order; nor does 
the record of the convention reveal an intent to proscribe private 
acts of discrimination. Materials placed before the electorate during 
the ratification campaign may be examined in vain for any hint or 
warning that a change of this magnitude was intended.135 If the 
constitutional language were now given such a latitudinarian inter-
pretation, the people might well feel misled. 
B. The Civil Rights Commission Provision as the Source 
of New Civil Rights 
If new civil rights were not created by the anti-discrimination 
declaration of article I, they must-if they exist-find their origin 
in the civil rights commission provision of article V. In particular, 
they must stem from the single sentence in that provision that 
specifies the substantive responsibilities of the Commission: 
"It shall be the duty of the commission in a manner which 
may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination 
against any person because of religion, race, color or national 
origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law 
and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of 
such civil rights without such discrimination." 
1!!2. Cf. Common Council v. Engel, 202 Mich. 5!!6, 54!!, 168 N.W. 465, 467 (1918) 
(invalidating a statute relating to Detroit school bonds as violative of a constitutional 
provision preventing "local acts" from becoming effective without a local referendum): 
"This very question of local legislation as applied to education was under considera-
tion in the constitutional convention and debated • • • • Had it been the sense of the 
convention that so important a subject as education should be excepted from the 
inhibition of section !!O, it could, and presumptively would, have been so provided in 
unequivocal terms. So far as a failure to do so after the attention of the convention was 
called to the subject aids construction, it is persuasive that such was not the 
intention." 
l!!!!. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
1!!4. Id. at 17!!. 
1!!5. See text at notes 16!!-68 infra. 
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This sentence has already received a preliminary analysis.136 
The conclusion was reached that the constitutional language does 
not authorize the Commission to correct whatever racial, religious, or 
ethnic discrimination it believes should be eliminated. The Commis-
sion is "to secure" against racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination 
only "the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution." 
The mere statement that the Commission is "to secure" "civil 
rights," whatever their content, does not mean that "rights" are 
thereby created. The journal of the convention and the materials 
submitted to the electorate during the ratification campaign, as 
well as the text of the document, reveal that the civil rights commis-
sion provision was an implementing provision, designed to assist in 
the enforcement of rights elsewhere created; it did not establish or 
create any new "civil rights." 
1. The historical record. About one hundred tightly-packed, 
double-column pages in the convention journal are required to 
reproduce the discussion of the civil rights commission provision. 
Within these pages there is much, of course, that is repetitious, ir-
relevant, and contradictory. But the task of interpretation is not to 
find, in a giant haystack, the needle that supports a conclusion that 
one desires to reach; rather, it is one of discovering the meaning 
and purpose of the words chosen. The debates, it must be remem-
bered, were not submitted to the electorate; the people, when they 
voted, had before them only the constitutional language, the Address 
to the People, and explanations and arguments expressed during the 
ratification campaign. The debates have only a limited relevance to 
the problem of constitutional interpretation-they may be ex-
amined to gain an impression of the thrust or the purpose of lan-
guage that is ambiguous when fairly viewed.137 
The debates, viewed in their entirety, corroborate the views ad-
vanced in this article. There was, from beginning to end, a coherent 
136. See text at notes 50-58 supra. 
137. The purpose of constitutional language may be illuminated by examining the 
proceedings of the constitutional convention. Kearney v. Board of State Auditors, 189 
Mich. 666, 671, 155 N.W. !HO, 511 (1915). But such materials must be used with care for, 
as Justice Cooley said, they are "commonly vague and inconclusive": 
"Where the statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts have 
nothing to do but to obey it. They may give a sensible and reasonable interpreta-
tion to legislative expressions which are obscure, but they have no right to distort 
those which are clear and intelligible. The fair and natural import of the terms 
employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern .••• 
"These rules are especially applicable to constitutions; for the people, in 
passing upon them, do not examine their clauses with a view to discover a secret 
or double meaning, but accept the most natural and obvious import of the words 
as the meaning designed to be conveyed ..•. " People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 
13 Mich. 127, 165-68 (1865) (concurring opinion of Cooley, J.). 
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notion of what the substantive responsibilities of the Civil Rights 
Commission were to be. Although the provisions governing the 
composition and powers of the Commission went through a con-
siderable evolution and expansion on the floor of the convention, 
the substantive responsibility of the Commission "to secure the 
protection of the civil rights guaranteed by [law and by] this con-
stitution" remained almost unchanged.138 There was extensive dis-
cussion of the scope and nature of the "civil rights" included within 
this charter. Such rights included constitutional protections against 
racial discrimination, both those stemming from the federal con-
stitution and those which were to be included in the revised con-
stitution; they included the statutory civil rights to be free from 
discriminatory treatment in public accommodations,139 public hous-
ing,u0 and employment.141 They did not include discriminatory 
conduct in the private housing market or in other areas, since rights 
protecting individuals from racial and other discrimination therein 
did not yet exist. Attempts to broaden the language to create, largely 
by implication, new civil rights were repeatedly rejected. 
One important exchange will illustrate these points. Delegate 
Leibrand asked Mr. Martin, chairman of the committee that had 
advanced the civil rights commission proposal, "what specific rights 
or claimed rights does your committee consider to be embraced in 
the term 'civil rights' as used in the proposed amendment?"142 Mr. 
Martin's reply, on behalf of the committee, was as follows: 
"Judge Leibrand, the answer to your question, I think, is 
this: this involves the rights of the citizen to not be discriminated 
against in a number of fields. The first of those, of course, is 
education, the right to get the kind of education which the 
individual can afford and which he wants to have, whether that 
might be in a profession or as a teacher or as a secretary or as 
a nurse, or whatever that might be. Second, it involves the right 
to nondiscrimination in those areas which are covered by the 
public nondiscrimination act which covers restaurants, motels, 
places of amusement, stores, public conveyances, theaters, bowl-
ing alleys, and places of public accommodation. Third, it covers 
employment-the right to nondiscrimination in the field of 
employment. Fourth, it covers nondiscrimination in the field of 
voting-the citizen's right to cast his vote and not to be deprived 
of his franchise. And fifth, it involves his right to buy housing 
Il!B. Compare the original Civil Rights Commission proposal, 2 R.EcoRD 1921-22, 
quoted above, with the final language of MICH. CoNsr. art. 5, § 29. 
1!19. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 750.146-.147 (1948). 
140. Ibid. 
141. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 42!1.!101-.!111 (Supp. 1961). 
142. 2 R.EcoRD 19!14. 
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where he can afford it and without discrimination in that field 
by public agencies or by those licensed by the state. It involves 
the question of discrimination in all of these fields, and the 
rights which would be protected by such a civil rights commis-
sion would be protected by those rights which are specified in 
the constitution."143 
The rights specified, of course, are those which already existed by 
statute or by constitutional provision: public education, 144 public 
accommodations,145 employment,146 public housing,147 and voting.148 
In connection with the public accommodations field, Mr. Martin 
referred explicitly to the statute. The reference to discrimination 
in housing "by those licensed by the state" undoubtedly refers to 
Rule 9 of the Corporation and Securities Commission, 149 which was 
promulgated in 1960 and declared invalid by the Michigan Supreme 
Court in February 1963,150 some ten months after the date of Mr. 
Martin's comments to the convention. 
A later exchange between Judge Leibrand and Mr. Van Dusen, 
who, like Mr. Martin, played an instrumental role in the fashioning 
of the civil rights commission provision, indicates that the language 
should be given its natural meaning. Judge Leibrand asked Mr. 
Van Dusen "who then will be the actual judge of the specific duties" 
of the Commission?151 Mr. Van Dusen replied: " ... the duties of the 
commission are prescribed in the constitution. They are to secure 
the protection of the civil rights guaranteed by law and this consti-
tution. If there is any question about what securing the protection 
of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution means, 
presumably the question would have to have judicial determination. 
I think it is reasonably clear."152 Surely Mr. Van Dusen would have 
said something more if the intent had been to create dramatic new 
civil rights. His conviction that the language "is reasonably clear" 
indicates that it should be given a natural, not a revolutionary, con-
struction. 
The unsuccessful efforts of a minority of delegates, principally 
143. Ibid. 
144. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2. 
145. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 750.146-.147 (1962). 
146. MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 423.301-.311 (1960). 
147. MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 750.146 (1962). 
148. See the materials cited notes 80-81 supra. 
149. MICH. AD. CODE § R 451.!l09 (Supp. 1960). 
150. McKibbin v. Corporation 8: Sec. Comm'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d 557 
(1963). Rule 9 defined racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination by licensed real estate 
brokers in any real estate transaction as "unfair dealing" which would subject the 
broker to license revocation. 
151. 2 REcoRD 1979. 
152. Ibid. 
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Democrats, to broaden the sentence defining the substantive re-
sponsibilities of the Commission also is highly relevant. The minor-
ity proposal, which will be referred to as the "Austin proposal," 
would have changed the sentence in question to read as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of the commission, in a manner which 
may be prescribed by law, to investigate violations of, and to 
secure the protection of the civil right to employment, educa-
tion, housing, public accommodations, and to such other civil 
rights as provided by law and the constitution."1153 
There was serious question concerning the meaning and scope of 
"the civil right to employment, education, housing, and public ac-
commodations." Some delegates either attacked the Austin proposal 
or supported it on the ground that it would create new civil rights;1154 
others, including its principal proponent, denied that it would have 
the effect of creating new civil rights.11515 The majority of delegates 
was not required to resolve the question of what effect the substi-
tute language would have, since all attempts to incorporate it were 
rejected. 
The views of Mr. Austin concerning the meaning of his proposal 
are significant: 
"I am going to suggest that we adopt the [Van Dusen] sub-
stitute, including those weakening changes, with one exception, 
and that is that we reinsert reference to the major fields of dis-
crimination. I feel that this is a must. They do not create any 
new rights. They are not enumerated elsewhere in the constitu-
tion. The executive committee enumerated them in its report1156 
and the courts may construe omission as indicating that we do 
not intend the scope of the commission to extend to all of these 
major fields of discrimination.''1157 
After Mr. Van Dusen had indicated, in reply to a question, that 
omission of reference to the four areas would not prevent the Com-
mission from dealing with these four areas (implicitly assuming that 
the legislature had created civil rights therein, as it had in all four 
of the enumerated areas), delegate Higgs put the issue directly to 
Mr. Austin: 
153. Id. at 1982. 
154. See id. at 1982-86. 
155. E.g., id. at 2186 (Mr. Austin); id. at 1986 (Mr. Everett's remarks expressing 
doubt over the meaning of the Austin language). 
156. As Mrs. Hatcher explained in her clarifying remarks, Mr. Austin was referring 
to the report of the Committee of Rights, Suffrage and Elections relating to the anti-
discrimination provision, not to a report of the Committee on the Executive Branch. 
Id. at 2187. 
157. Id. at 2186. 
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"MR. HIGGS: My question is this: is it your intent in insert-
ing this language to create any civil rights or to define any civil 
rights beyond the civil rights presently guaranteed by law or 
by this constitution in other sections? 
"MR. AUSTIN: Mr. President, Mr. Higgs, it is not our in-
tention [speaking for the proponents of his amendment as well 
as himself] to create any new rights, only to focus attention 
on the fields in which we have discrimination."158 
Then Mr. Higgs summed up his own conclusions: 
"Real progress in this field will only come through the 
broadest support, not only on the part of the delegates here 
assembled but upon the part of the people of the state of Michi-
gan who will be called upon to pass upon the work we do. It 
will not come by partisan bickering, by appeals to prejudice 
in the name of civil rights, or any such emotional reasons. I urge 
that you vote against this because it is unnecessary. I think 
it may raise questions that are not intended to be raised and I 
think if you believe in the real sincerity of this purpose, you 
will oppose it."159 
A few moments later, after a speech by Mrs. Elliott, the conven-
tion rejected the Austin proposal by a vote of seventy-three to forty-
four.100 
At this late date it is impossible to determine whether the dele-
gates took Mr. Austin's remarks at face value (and therefore thought 
the language was unnecessary because it did not create any new 
rights) or whether, like Mr. Higgs, they feared that the additional 
language might have the effect of creating new rights. Nor is it neces-
sary to fathom the motives of individual delegates. The action of the 
delegates comes through loud and clear: the convention intended 
neither to create new civil rights nor to adopt language that might 
be susceptible of that construction. 
2. The appeal to the electorate. The people, when they ratified 
the revised constitution, acted on the basis of the materials placed 
before them: the constitutional text, the explanatory comments in 
the Address to the People, and the comments and arguments of 
proponents and opponents. These materials may properly be con-
sulted to determine the understanding which the people may have 
had concerning the scope and meaning of the civil rights commission 
proposal.161 
158. Id. at 2188. 
159. Ibid. 
160. Id. at 2189. 
161. Kearney v. Board of State Auditors, 189 Mich. 666, 671, 155 N.W. 510, 511 
(1915). 
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The Address to the People, unfortunately, does not provide addi-
tional light, since its explanation of article V, section 29 is limited 
to a bland paraphrase of the constitutional text.162 The same is true 
of much of the literature circulated during the ratification campaign. 
But a number of important statements went into more detail con-
cerning the meaning of the civil rights commission provision. The 
available materials uniformly corroborate the views here advanced. 
On the other hand, I have not discovered a single statement by 
anyone to the effect that the constitution created new civil rights in 
such areas as private housing or that the Civil Rights Commission 
was to have plenary and exclusive powers to deal with problems of 
racial discrimination. 
During the ratification campaign, delegates to the convention 
made a number of statements explaining the meaning of the Civil 
Rights Commission provision. For example, a group of delegates, in 
a brochure discussing the constitutional provisions in the civil rights 
field, defined in detail the "civil rights" to be enforced by the Com-
mission: "The Constitution does not attempt to define the civil 
rights that are protected against discrimination. The term will in-
clude any rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution and those 
specified and defined by statute."163 The brochure then listed some 
of the existing constitutional and statutory provisions and predicted: 
"Similar legislation would implement equal protection of the laws 
with respect to such matters as housing and the administration of 
justice."164 Delegate William B. Cudlip, in an article in a legal 
journal, replied to attacks on the civil rights commission provision: 
" ... it is a basis of objection by opponents who urge its deficiency 
because it fails to define some civil rights as employment, education, 
housing and public accommodations. These are essentially individual 
versus individual rights and are matters for statutory law. Eminent 
scholars in the field of constitutional law advise that the inclusion of 
such specifics in a constitution is defeating."165 Similarly, delegate 
Harold Norris, a leading proponent of the minority proposals con-
cerning civil rights, attacked the civil rights commission provision be-
162. MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, WHAT THE PROPOSED NEW STATE 
CONSTITUTION MEANS TO You 53-54 (1962), reprinted in 2 Rl:CORD 3383-84. 
163. Delegates Pollock, J. H. Hannah, Cudlip, Mosier, Lawrence, Cushman, Judd, 
Martin, &: McCauley, Your Individual Rights in the New Constitution 4-5 (undated 
brochure circulated prior to April 1963 election). 
164. Id. at 5. 
165. Cudlip, The Proposed Constitution Should be Approved, 31 DETROIT LAw. 7, 
8 (1963). The reference to the recommendations of eminent scholars included the 
comments of Professor Paul G. Kauper, University of Michigan Law School, in several 
memoranda submitted to committees of the convention. 
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cause, among other things, "The civil rights to be protected, and 
against whom, public or private, are not explicitly declared or pro-
tected .... The provision is not self-executing and will require imple-
mentation by an unrepresentative Legislature whose inaction caused 
the proposed provision."166 
Materials circulated by a number of organizations during the 
ratification campaign expressed the same views. A comprehensive 
booklet prepared by a non-partisan research organization took great 
pains to point out that the new constitution would not impose 
enforceable duties on private persons: 
"The enumeration and definition of rights in the field of 
individual relationships have traditionally rested, however, with 
statute law (legislative prescription) and have not commonly 
been taken note of in constitutional law. Thus, the reluctance of 
the Convention to enter the field of social and economic rights 
of individuals, leaving this to the legislature, extends the re-
liance on a tradition solution. 
"The creation of a bi-partisan civil rights commission in the 
revised constitution established the machinery by which the 
protection of federal and state laws on individual rights may be 
implemented. . . . 
"Some object that the provision for a civil rights commission 
does not go far enough in specifically including exact language 
regarding such things as employment, housing, public accom-
modations and education. 
"As previously noted, this is left to legislative decision under 
the theory that constitutional civil rights is a matter of people 
protected from government, while problems of individual-versus-
individual are more properly a matter for statute law."167 
Similarly, organizations opposing the new constitution argued that 
the Civil Rights Commission was "a powerless agency" because the 
constitution "fails to spell out that the proposed commission can 
deal with the really vital problems of employment, education, 
housing, or public accommodations.''168 
C. The Attorney General's Opinions 
In 1963, prior to the effectiveness of the revised constitution, 
Michigan Attorney General Frank J. Kelley issued three legal opin-
ions concerning the powers and procedures of the Civil Rights 
166. Norris, Six Serious Weaknesses [of the Civil Rights Commission Proposal], 
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 24, 1963, p. 3-B, col. 4. 
167. Citizens Research Council, A Digest of the Proposed Constitution, Report 
No. 213 at 10-11, Nov. 1962. 
168. The Citizens Committee To Defend Michigan's Constitution. Here's How the 
Proposed Michigan Constitution Hurts You 7 (undated brochure circulated prior to 
.April 1963 election). 
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Commission.169 The Attorney General's views are deserving of care-
ful attention because of the authoritativeness of their source and 
because they have been widely publicized and accepted. Governor 
Romney has stated that he agrees with the Attorney General,170 
and members and staff of the Civil Rights Commission have made 
public statements along the same line.171 
First, the Attorney General believes that article V, section 29, 
assisted in an uncertain manner by the anti-discrimination declara-
tion of article I, created extensive civil rights which protect indi-
viduals from private discrimination on racial, religious, .and ethnic 
grounds in the fields of employment, education, housing, and public 
accommodations. As the Attorney General put it: 
"From a plain reading of Article V, section 29, it is clear that 
the people have conferred plenary power upon the Civil Rights 
Commission in its sphere of authority as a constitutional com-
mission to investigate and to secure the enjoyment of civil rights 
without discrimination. 
" ... [E]qual opportunity to housing, both public and 
private, is a civil right protected by the Revised Constitution 
and . . . the investigation of alleged discrimination of this civil 
right has been vested by the people in the Civil Rights Com-
mission under Article V, Section 29 of the Revised Constitu-
tion. 
"All of the foregoing is a clear expression of the public 
policy of this State."172 
Second, the Attorney General maintains that the legislature's 
powers to deal with problems of racial discrimination have been 
greatly restricted. Again and again, he has stated that the Commis-
sion has "plenary"178 power in its sphere of authority to protect civil 
169. 0Ps. MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4161 Only 22, 1963); id., No. 4195 (Oct. 3, 1963); and 
id., No. 4211 (Nov. 18, 1963). 
170. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, July 27, 1963, p. 3-A, col. 8: "Governor Romney 
told Michigan mayors Friday their citizens no longer have a choice between segregated 
and integrated housing. • . . After expressing agreement with the Attorney General 
Frank Kelley's interpretation of the Commission created by the new Constitution, 
Romney said: 'As far as I'm concerned we're going to have universal application and 
enforcement of State law.' " 
171. E.g., Ann .Arbor News, May 6, 1964, p. 21, col. 2-3: "Judge Feikens [co-chair-
man of the Civil Rights Commission] said the commission is operating on the assump-
tion that it will have power to eliminate discrimination in all housing transactions, 
and stated in response to an audience question, that this power would extend to renting 
of a single room." See also the reported statements of the Commission's Executive 
Director. Detroit Free Press, May 31, 1964, p. 3-A, col. 8: "[Executive Director 
Gordin] said an opinion last July by Attorney General Frank J. Kelley that his 
commission has 'plenary power' means it has pre-empted the civil rights field from the 
Legislature and local lawmakers." 
172. OPS, MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4195, at 2-3 (Oct. 3, 1963). The first paragraph is a 
quotation from the earlier opinion of July 22, 1963. 
173. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1963) defines "plenary" as 
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rights. "The legislature," he has said, "cannot decrease or abrogate 
the constitutional powers of the Civil Rights Commission."174 Later 
he added: "I find no authority in the Constitution under which the 
legislature could abrogate or limit in any way the power of the 
Civil Rights Commission in the fields of employment, education, 
housing and public accommodations."175 Moreover, the constitu-
tional provision authorizing legislative suspension of administrative 
rules is inapplicable to the Commission.176 He did indicate, however, 
that the legislature, which is obligated to appropriate funds for the 
effective operation of the Commission, does possess the limited 
power to "prescribe the mode or manner in which investigations are 
to be conducted by the Civil Rights Commission."177 
Finally, the Attorney General's emphasis on the "plenary" and 
"exclusive" nature of the Commission's constitutional powers has led 
him to the further conclusion that local governments, as well as the 
legislature, are excluded from the areas occupied by the Commission. 
Under this view, municipal ordinances that seek to create or en-
force civil rights in the field of private housing are invalid because 
the Civil Rights Commission has preempted the field.178 However, 
"complete in every respect: absolute, perfect, unqualified." It is apparent from the con-
text that the Attorney General is using the word in this sense. At one point he substi-
tutes "exclusive" for "plenary." OPS. MICH. Arr'y GEN. No. 4161, at 15 au1y 22, 1963). 
174. Id. at 5. 
175. Id. at 17. 
176. Id. at 19-20. 
177. Id. at 17-18. 
178. OPs. MicH. Arr'Y GEN. No 4195 (Oct. 3, 1963). Two Michigan cities have 
adopted fair housing ordinances. On September 16, 1963, Ann Arbor enacted an 
ordinance forbidding discrimination in buildings containing five or more units or in 
buildings or lots comprising part of five or more dwellings owned by or subject to 
the control of any one person. ANN ARBOR, MICH., ORDINANCE CODE ch. 112, §§ 9.151-
.160 (1963). The Ann Arbor Human Relations Commission is responsible for its admin-
istration, and violation is punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or ten days 
imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine. On December 23, 1963, the city of Grand 
Rapids adopted a. similar ordinance applicable to three or more buildings or units. 
Grand Rapids, Mich., Ordinance 1628, Dec. 23, 1963. The validity of the Ann Arbor 
ordinance has been attacked on pre-emption and other grounds, but the litigation 
has not reached a conclusion. City of Ann Arbor v. Hubble, Docket No. CR373, 
Washtenaw County Cir. Ct. (action commenced June 11, 1964). 
Courts in several states have upheld municipal ordinances forbidding racial dis-
crimination in the housing market against attacks that state legislation has pre-empted 
the field. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953) (sustain-
ing validity of D.C. ordinances dealing with discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation); Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962) (upholding the 
validity of Kansas City's public accommodations ordinance); Martin v. City of New 
York, 22 Misc. 2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (sustaining New York City's 
fair housing ordinance); Stanton Land Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 
1580 (Allegheny County C.P., 1963) (upholding the validity of Pittsburgh's fair 
housing ordinance). Contra: Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 
773 (1944). See generally, Pearl &: Terner, Suruey: Fair Housing Laws-Design for 
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a municipal ordinance which has no enforcement machinery, but 
which seeks only to persuade, counsel, and educate, is valid; munici-
palities, according to the Attorney General, may establish a body 
empowered to conduct investigations in the civil rights area and to 
carry on conciliation and educational activities.178 
I. The argument based on interpreting the term "civil rights" 
as all legally protected interests. A substantial portion of the At-
torney General's first opinion is devoted to defining "the basic civil 
rights which are inherent and derived from citizenship in a par-
ticular body politic."180 The opinion includes in this category the 
nondiscrimination rights established in employment, public educa-
tion, public accommodations, and public housing by various Mich-
igan statutes and constitutional provisions.181 Turning to the area of 
private housing, the Attorney General, after quoting from Shelley 
v. Kraemer,182 concludes: 
"Thus, it is clear that the [Federal] Civil Rights Act of 1866 
creates a civil right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and 
convey real and personal property. It is significant to note that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 draws no distinction between 
public and private housing. Consequently, one must conclude 
that Congress intended to create a civil right in the area of 
private housing as well as public housing."183 
I must confess to some shock and disbelief when I first read this 
passage. It is hombook law that the fourteenth amendment-and 
hence all legislation enacted pursuant to it-protects only against 
state action and does not extend to discriminatory acts of private 
persons.184 Moreover, this proposition is stated in the most forth-
Equal opportunity, 16 STAN. L. REv. 849, 882-99 (1964); Note, Conflicts Between State 
Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1959). 
179. OPs. MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4211 (Nov. 18, 1963). 
180. OPS. MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4161, at 6 Guly 22, 1963). 
181. Id. at 6-8. 
182. 334 U.S. I (1948) (enforcement by a state court of a restrictive covenant 
prohibiting sale of land to Negroes is "state action" within the purview of the 
fourteenth amendment). 
183. OPS. MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4161, at 9 Guly 22, 1963). 
184. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875): "The fourteenth 
amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than the [due 
process clause] • • • add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the 
Constitution against another"; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883): "civil rights, 
such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired 
by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority ••. "; Peterson v. 
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963): "It cannot be disputed that under our decisions 
'private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection 
Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been 
found to have become involved in it.'" 
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right terms in Shelley v. Kraemer,185 the very case from which the 
Attorney General was quoting. The Federal Civil Rights Act of 
1866, despite the seeming breadth of the language it contains, pro-
tects Negroes only from state-enforced discrimination in housing. 
In the absence of a drastic rewriting of precedents by the Supreme 
Court or explicit congressional action, federal law cannot be viewed 
as giving rise to enforceable guarantees against racial discrimination 
in the private housing market. 
Perhaps the Attorney General's reference to federal law was 
meant to suggest the more subtle argument that the words "civil 
rights" in article V, section 29 include all legally protected interests 
or at least all such interests dealt with in such civil rights statutes 
as the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1866. The argument, in brief, is 
that the Michigan constitution employs the term "civil rights," not 
in the specific sense of enforceable guarantees that protect persons 
against discriminatory treatment by reason of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude, but in the generalized sense which includes 
all legally protected interests of individual citizens. Under this view, 
article V, section 29 would empower the Civil Rights Commission 
"to secure the equal protection of [all interests of personality] 
guaranteed by law and by this constitution without discrimination 
against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin." 
Since purchase and ownership of property is a legally protected 
interest under Michigan common law-and is also guaranteed 
against state-enforced denial on racial grounds by the Federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1866-it can be argued that any racial discrimination 
affecting purchase or ownership of property is within the jurisdic-
tion of the Civil Rights Commission. 
In my judgment, it does not make sense to interpret the term 
"civil rights" as including all legally protected interests. A more 
natural reading would confine the term to the narrowt;r category 
of "rights" that carry specific remedies and impose correlative 
duties on other private persons. The only plausibility to the broader 
interpretation derives from the fact that article V, section 29 qualifies 
the "civil rights" to be protected by the Commission by referring to 
"discrimination . . . because of religion, race, color or national 
origin"; it is therefore possible to argue that "civil rights" is not used 
in the narrow sense of enforceable rights of nondiscrimination, since 
185. 334 U.S. I, 13 (1948): "Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883), the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law 
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only 
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no 
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 
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the reference to discrimination would then be redundant. But this 
can also be attributed to an excess of caution-a disinclination to 
leave open the possibility that the bare phrase "civil rights" would 
be viewed in the broader sense of enforceable personal rights, a 
reading that would allow the Commission to exercise a jurisdiction 
analogous to that of common-law courts.186 And, at most, it argues 
that "civil rights" should be read in the central sense of enforceable 
personal rights, 187 rather than in a loose sense which includes all 
legally protected interests. 
Legally protected interests, of course, assume an almost infinite 
variety of forms and receive varying degrees of protection. Multiple 
remedies may be provided for the invasion of some interests, while 
others are accompanied by little or no remedial machinery. The 
scope of a right determines the degree of protection that is 
afforded: Who possesses the right? Is it enforceable only against 
state officials? Is it enforceable against private persons? These char-
acteristics are part of the "right" itself. 
An illustration may clarify the distinction between "rights" and 
"legally protected interests." Suppose, for example, that A desires to 
sell his private home. In selecting a purchaser, he discriminates 
against B, a Negro. Does A's conduct violate B's "civil rights?" A 
lawyer, whatever his views concerning the morality of A's behavior, 
must give a negative answer. Apart from any rights created by the 
new Michigan constitution, B does not have a legally enforceable 
right to purchase A's house. A, on the other hand, is not under any 
duty to sell to B; nor is he under any obligation not to discriminate 
on account of race in the selection of a purchaser.188 However, both 
A and B have legally protected interests in the purchase and sale of 
property: each possesses the power or capacity, in conjunction with 
one another, to create property interests that will be recognized and 
enforced by the courts. Thus, if A of his own volition decides to sell 
to B and the two enter into a valid contract, legal interests are 
186. If the Commission's jurisdiction extended to the denial of all enforceable 
personal rights, ordinary tort and contract litigation would be within its competence. 
Moreover, individual rights, for example the right to vote, may be denied on nonracial 
grounds, such as the loss of civil rights by convicts and felons. By limiting the authority 
of the Civil Rights Commission to denial of civil rights based on racial, religious, and 
ethnic considerations, denials of other enforceable personal rights were placed beyond 
its jurisdiction. • 
187. Cf. IO AM. JuR. Civil Rights § 894 (1937), which defines "civil rights" as follows: 
"Civil rights in their full sense cover a wide field of ordinary individual rights assured 
to every member of a well-regulated community. The term embraces the rights due 
from one citizen to another, deprivation of which is a civil injury for which redress 
may be sought in a civil action." 
188. McKibbin v. Corporation & Sec. Comm'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d 557 (1963) 
(by implication). 
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created that Michigan must respect and enforce. Federal law-the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866-forbids Michigan from denying B, because 
of his race, the power to create and enjoy enforceable property in-
terests, whenever other individuals are willing to deal with him or 
to grant or devise property to him.189 
The capacity to create certain enforceable legal relations by one's 
voluntary act (often only with the conjunction of another person), 
such as contract rights, property rights, the marriage relation, and so 
on, is an essential ingredient of citizenship. Federal constitutional 
guarantees, implemented by Congress, prevent any state from deny-
ing these "rights" on racial grounds; but these rights are enforceable 
only against state officers and not against private persons. 
The Michigan constitution is a legal document. When it speaks 
of "civil rights" it refers to legal rights and not to the looser con-
ception of "rights" that has nothing to do with law or with courts 
but is part of the common language. When a man asks his neighbor, 
"Now don't you think I am within my rights?," he is referring to 
aspects of action or relation that are desirable and are socially 
approved. In this sense, a person's "rights" are what people think 
he ought to have; they have little to do with the behavior of courts 
in response to legal claims of right. In legal usage, a right involves 
a legal relation between people. If A has a right that B shall do 
something, A can invoke the aid of a court if B fails to perform 
his duty. Hohfield reminds us to look for a duty before we talk of 
a right. I£ no one has been required to behave in the manner that 
corresponds with the claimed right, if no remedial machinery is avail-
able for its vindication, then we are talking about privileges or 
powers or moral commands-but not about legal right.100 
These arguments based on ordinary usage are bolstered by the 
tenor of the discussion in the convention. The term "civil rights," 
both in connection with the anti-discrimination declaration of article 
I and the civil rights commission provision of article V, was used 
by the delegates in the sense of legally enforceable guarantees against 
189. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (right to acquire, enjoy, and use 
property guaranteed by fourteenth amendment violated by city ordinance forbidding 
Negroes to occupy houses in blocks where majority of houses are occupied by white 
persons). 
• 190. Mr. Justice Holmes made the point long ago: "[Flor legal purposes a right is 
only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact 
that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who are said to contravene 
it-just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in 
space. One phrase adds no more than the other to what we know without it." HOLMES, 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 313 (1920). The pioneer analysis is that of Wesley N. Hohfeld. 
See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
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discriminatory treatment.191 This usage is found in the majority 
report supporting the proposal that became the anti-discrimination 
declaration: "As Mr. Hannah stated in his paper to the committee, 
'Civil rights as used herein means guarantees to protect against 
discrimination and segregation because of race, color, religion, 
ancestry or national origin. . . .' "192 
A final argument against interpreting "civil rights" as including 
every legally protected interest parallels a point discussed earlier.193 
If the Civil Rights Commission has been given plenary and exclusive 
authority to protect every person against "discrimination .•. because 
of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of [legally 
protected interests]," the fabric of legal relations in the community 
has been fundamentally reshaped and traditional agencies of govern-
ment have been shouldered aside by a brash newcomer, the Civil 
Rights Commission. Neither the text, nor the journal of the con-
vention, nor the materials submitted to the electorate provide any 
support for such an abrupt innovation. 
Indeed, the implications of the Attorney General's position are 
staggering. Private organizations that restrict their membership on 
racial, religious, or ethnic grounds would violate the constitutional 
command when they refuse to admit an applicant not possessing the 
required characteristics; they would be interfering with the appli-
cant's enjoyment of his legal interest in private association. A 
Lutheran church that limited eligibility to its vacant pastorate to 
Lutherans would be interfering on religious grounds with the em-
ployment interests of Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and others. 
A family that limited the availability of live-in facilities to a 
college student of similar race, religion or national origin would be 
interfering with the housing interests of other students. Perhaps even 
a testator's bequest establishing a trust fund to provide scholarships 
for needy Negro students would be invalidated. The very breadth 
of the implications of the Attorney General's position casts doubt 
upon its validity. 
And what are the remedial incidents of the constitutional pro-
tections that would thus be placed beyond legislative adaptation? 
Suppose, for example, that A has discriminated against B, a Negro, 
in selecting a boarder to live in his home. In the absence of legis-
lative creation of rights and remedies relating to racial discrimina-
tion in private housing, may the Civil Rights Commission order A 
191. See, e.g., 1 REcoRD 740; 2 id. 1934, 1982-83. 
192. 1 id. at 740. 
193. See text at note 130 supra. 
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to rent his room to B? If the room has already been rented to C, 
may the Commission require A to pay compensatory damages to B? 
May it invalidate the lease between A and C? May it require A to 
pay punitive damages to B or to pay a civil fine to the Commission? 
I£ A has been assisted in his discriminatory behavior by D, a real 
estate broker, may the Commission revoke D's broker's license? (No 
one, I trust, would argue that the Commission-even with legislative 
authorization--could entertain a criminal proceeding against either 
A or D, charging them with illegal discriminatory behavior.) These 
are questions one would expect a legislature to deal with when 
enacting legislation involving discrimination in private housing. 
Although courts and administrative agencies participate in the defini-
tion of legal interests and the fashioning of remedies, legislative 
bodies play the primary role in adjusting legal protections to meet 
society's changing needs. The explicit reference in article I, section 
2 to legislative implementation and the repeated references to legis-
lative prerogatives in article V, section 29 indicate that no departure 
from this traditional approach was intended in the revised constitu-
tion. Article V, section 29 does not give the Civil Rights Commission 
virtually unlimited authority to establish standards governing private 
conduct and to formulate the remedial aspects of any violation of 
these standards. 
2. The argument based on the sequence of events in the con-
vention. The Attorney General's conclusion that the Civil Rights 
Commission has plenary authority "to protect and secure the equal 
opportunity in employment, education, housing and public accom-
modations" does not rest solely or even primarily on a broad reading 
of the term "civil rights." Principal reliance is placed on the se-
quence of events in the evolution of the civil rights commission pro-
posal-the temporary acceptance by the convention of the Austin 
proposal, which contained specific reference to "the civil right to 
employment, education, housing, [and] public accommodations,"194 
and several statements by Mr. Van Dusen to the effect that his sub-
stitute proposal, which the convention adopted, did not make any 
substantive changes in the powers of the Commission.195 
The three or four passages relied upon by the Attorney General 
must be read in the context of the convention's entire consideration 
of the civil rights issue. When this is done, it is apparent that the 
excerpts relied upon by the Attorney General do not support the 
construction he gives them. 
194. For the full text of the Austin proposal, see 2 RECORD 1982. 
195. Id. at 2182, 2186. 
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First, the remarks of Messrs. Van Dusen and Pollock in explain-
ing the substitute proposal that had been worked out in the Re-
publican caucus were literally correct. Mr. Van Dusen said only that 
civil rights in employment, education, housing, and public accom-
modations would be "within the purview of the civil rights guar-
anteed by law in this constitution."196 Civil rights in the four areas 
mentioned had been repeatedly referred to by the delegates. They 
were existing rights under present statutes and constitutional provi-
sions. Since they were "civil rights guaranteed by [ existing] law," 
it was apparent that they were within the "area of concern"197 of the 
Commission. If it could not act upon them, it could not act upon 
anything. 
The exchange between Mr. Binkowski and Mr. Van Dusen, which 
was relied upon by the Attorney General, is along the same lines: 
"MR. BINKOWSKI: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for 
the record I would like to defer to Mr. Van Dusen because 
I think that this point should be clarified, in case we have a 
judicial review of this section so that it is clear that if this con-
vention does not go on record as adopting the Austin and Elliott 
amendment, certainly it is not to be construed that we do not 
want a civil rights commission operating in those enumerated 
areas. 
"MR. VAN DUSEN: Mr. President, I would answer Mr. Bin-
kowski's question very clearly: I don't think that the sub-
stitute amendment intends any substantive difference in this 
area. I thought I made that reasonably clear in my opening 
remarks. The only reason for not omitting the 4 enumerated 
areas of discrimination was that in view of the report of the 
committee on declaration of rights, suffrage and elections in 
connection with [the anti-discrimination declaration of article 
I], that committee made it very clear that among the civil rights, 
therefore, to be within the area of concern of this commission, 
are the matters of equal opportunity in employment, education, 
housing and public accommodations. [Mr. Van Dusen then read 
a passage from the report of the Committee on Rights, Suffrage, 
and Elections.] 
"The only reason for the omission of these specific areas of 
discrimination from the substitute amendment now under con-
sideration was that it would be redundant to mention them in 
the light of the action already taken with respect to [ the anti-
discrimination declaration], and further, that it would be con-
strued perhaps as a limitation upon the powers of the commis-
sion, which was not intended by the sponsors of the Austin 
196. Id. at 2182. Statutory rights in the housing field extended, of course, only to 
public housing. 
197. Id. at 2186. 
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amendment or by the sponsors of the substitute now before the 
convention. "198 
In short, it was no one's intention to deprive the Civil Rights Com-
mission of authority to enforce civil rights in any area in which rights 
protecting against discrimination had been created by statute or by 
constitution. 
Second, reference to the earlier consideration of the anti-discrim-
ination declaration and to the report of the committee that spon-
sored it do not reveal an intent to create new civil rights. It was a 
way of saying that "we have been through this once before; the 
majority is ·willing to make a general declaration and to create a 
Commission that will operate upon rights created elsewhere; the 
minority wants to include much broader language; we refused to 
do so then, and we refuse to do so now." This is implicit in Mrs. 
Hatcher's remarks. She spoke immediately after Mr. Van Dusen had 
finished his reply to Mr. Binkowski, supra, and she reminded the 
delegates that the language Mr. Van Dusen had quoted199 ("The 
principal, but not exclusive, areas of concern are equal opportunities 
in employment, education, housing, and public accommodations.") 
was from the committee report and had not been included in the 
constitution: " ... [W]e mentioned civil rights [in the constitution], 
but we did not spell out the meaning of civil rights. I believe in our 
committee meeting we accepted the language to be inserted in the 
comments that the areas of civil rights would mean housing, educa-
tion, public accommodations and the like .... "200 In short, these are 
the areas in which rights existed or in which there was hope that the 
legislature would create rights. 
Third, the Attorney General assumes the convention understood 
that the Austin proposal, which was temporarily adopted, would 
create broad new civil rights, including freedom from discrimination 
in all private housing. This was not the case. The language of the 
Austin amendment-"the civil right to employment, education, 
housing, public accommodations, and to such other civil rights as 
provided by law and the constitution"-does not require this con-
198. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
199. Mr. Van Dusen read from the report presenting the anti-discrimination 
declaration: "Delegate John Hannah .•• gave impressive and moving testimony before 
the committee (on Rights, Suffrage and Elections) upon the wisdom and necessity 
of such a clause to protect negroes and other minorities against discrimination in 
housing, employment, education, and the like. 
"Later on in the same report they state that 'The principal, but not exclusive, 
areas of concern are equal opportunities in employment, education, housing, and 
public accommodations.'" Ibid. 
200. Id. at 2186-87. 
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struction. Perhaps a more plausible reading is that "the civil right" 
in the four enumerated areas is that already "provided by law." It is 
noteworthy that civil rights had been created in all four areas;201 
in the housing field the rights extended, of course, only to public 
housing. 
Nor did proponents or opponents of the broader Austin language 
clarify its meaning, either in the late hours of March 29 when the 
question was first discussed or a week later when the group led by 
Mr. Austin attempted to reinsert similar language in the Van Dusen 
proposal. On the earlier date, five Democratic delegates spoke in 
favor of the Austin proposal, but each of them was vague and 
indefinite concerning its precise substantive import. Mr. Austin said 
that his provision would "put the teeth in this commission that it 
needs if it is going to do an effective job ... ,"202 but this remark 
may have referred to the procedural powers, which were spelled out 
for the first time in his proposal. Mr. Binkowski talked about equal 
opportunity in lofty terms,203 and Mr. Nord was equally ambiguous 
concerning the effect of enumerating the four areas.204 Mr. Norris 
was hardly more definite, commenting that the Austin proposal 
"does carry fonvard the idea of giving specific form to the rights 
which we seek to protect as the indispensable minimums to full 
equality and full humanity for all of our citizens .... "205 There is 
in these comments, of course, an aura of "this language accomplishes 
more." It was sufficient to arouse fears in some delegates that existing 
rights of private association would be threatened.206 But the discus-
sion immediately turned to other matters-the composition of the 
Commission and the list of powers in the second paragraph. The 
question of its meaning was not clarified before the evening session 
on March 29 adjourned. 
Moreover, Mr. Austin, the principal proponent of the broader 
language, repeatedly declared that his language would not create 
any new civil rights.207 The delegates were entitled to take him at 
201. See statutes cited notes 145-47 supra. 
202. 2 REcoRD 1982. 
203. Id. at 1983. 
204. Id. at 1984-85. 
205. Id. at 1984. 
206. See, e.g., the fears of Mr. Hatch: "I don't know what the civil right to employ-
ment is. Nowhere in the constitution have we defined a civil right of employment. As 
Mr. Everett pointed out earlier, does this include the right to work? Just what does it 
include? I don't know. The civil right to education. What does this mean? Does it 
mean that everyone has a right to education, K through 12, through college? Just what 
does it mean? The civil right to housing. Does this conceivably mean that if I desire 
to sell my home only to persons of Dutch descent, I would then be in violation of this 
civil right to housing? And, if so, what can this commission do to me?" Id. at 2002. 
207. Mr. Austin stated that inclusion of words referring to four specific areas of 
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his word. When Mr. Van Dusen stated that "I have discussed this 
sentence with the proponents of the original Austin amendment and 
I think it is reasonably clear that there is no substantive change 
here,"208 it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Austin had told Van 
Dusen what Austin stated on the floor of the convention-that his 
language would not create new rights. Other delegates appear not 
to have shared Mr. Van Dusen's conviction that omission of the 
Austin language made no difference; indeed, the efforts of the 
Democratic minority to reinsert it after it had been omitted argue 
that it was thought to be significant. But actions speak louder than 
words. The convention, in rejecting the Austin language, did not, 
as the Attorney General argues, adopt it by implication. 
Finally, the manner in which the civil rights commission provi-
sion evolved argues against giving significance to the temporary adop-
tion of the Austin language on March 29. The major step taken on 
that date was the decision to have a self-executing Commission with 
certain minimum procedural powers. The Austin proposal, sub-
mitted as an amendment to an amendment,209 was the first proposal 
to combine these two self-executing features. Most of the discussion 
of the Austin proposal was concerned with the language that dealt 
with the establishment, composition, and powers of the Commis-
sion;210 definition of the "civil rights" to be protected was discussed 
only briefly. 
Moreover, the parliamentary situation was confused and the hour 
was late. No one had seen the various proposals in advance, a prob-
lem that caused some complaint,211 and repeated references were 
made to the lateness of the hour and the fatigue of the delegates.212 
The importance of the Austin proposal was thought to be its self-
discrimination "is a must. They do not create any rights." Id. at 2186. Later, in 
response to Mr. Higgs' specific question, he stated: "it is not our intention to create 
any new rights, only to focus attention on the fields in which we have discrimination," 
Id. at 2188. 
208. Id. at 2182. 
209. Mr. Boothby had offered a substitute to the committee amendment. Id. at 1976. 
The Boothby amendment was adopted, 118 to nine. Id. at 1979. Mr. Bentley then 
offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Boothby amendment. Id. 
at 1982. When it became clear that amendments to the Austin proposal could not be 
considered unless the Bentley amendment was withdrawn, Mr. Bentley withdrew his 
amendment, thus making it possible for the committee of the whole to consider amend-
ments to the pending Austin proposal. Id. at 1989. 
210. See id. at 1982-87, -1988-2006. 
211. See, e.g., id. at 2003, where Mr. Leppien observed, "I hope that this convention 
never again asks the delegates to be in a convention session of this kind and not have 
before us the necessary copies of amendments as long as the Austin or other amend-
ments that have been before us this night." 
212. Id. at 2002 (Mr. Higgs); id. at 2001 (Mr. Lawrence); id. at 2005 (Mr. Wanger). 
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executing features in terms of the establishment of the Commission 
and its minimum powers. After the session of March 29, further 
consideration of the civil rights commission provision was postponed 
so that the Republican caucus could give it more careful considera-
tion.213 It is only fair to assume that the changes that were made, and 
that were then adopted by the convention, were made deliberately 
and for a purpose. 
3. The argument based on the convention's rejection of other 
constitutional provisions. The Attorney General's opinion also relies 
upon the fact that the convention, after adopting the civil rights 
commission provision, twice rejected a proposal to include in the 
declaration of rights a section forbidding the legislature, other than 
by general law, to limit the right of an owner of real property "to 
convey, grant, or devise said property."214 In fact, the initial "prop-
erty owner's proposal" came before the committee of the whole two 
weeks before the final adoption of the civil rights commission pro-
vision, and, after full discussion, it was rejected by the convention.215 
Later attempts to include this provision in the declaration of rights 
failed for the same or similar reasons and had little or nothing to do 
with the civil rights commission proposal. 
The "property owner's proposal" was intended to be largely 
declaratory of the common law. It would not have impaired the 
legislature's power to restrict private discrimination in the housing 
market; it merely required that any such restriction be done by the 
legislature and by general law. Many delegates thought the major 
purpose was to prevent an administrative agency from promulgating 
rules that would limit the existing right of a property owner to 
sell or devise his property as he desired.216 The validity of Rule 9 of 
the Corporation and Securities Commission, prohibiting real estate 
213. Mr. Van Dusen, in introducing the substitute proposal which was ultimately 
adopted, reminded the delegates of the prior consideration of the Austin proposal: 
"I think all of the delegates will recall that the section which we are now considering 
was adopted in the closing hours of a long day's session which ran on well into the 
evening. Many amendments were made to it rather hastily and without the opportunity 
for detailed consideration. One of the reasons for the delay of the consideration of 
Committee Proposal 71 from last Friday until today was to give some opportunity for 
some careful consideration of this section, with the opportunity and hope of making 
clarifying amendments which would improve it, which would make clear its intentions." 
Id. at 2182. 
214. OPs. MICH. ATI'Y GEN. No. 4161, at 14-15 ijuly 22, 1963). 
215. The text of the proposal is reproduced in 2 REcoRD 2272. The discussion 
appears in id. at 2272-87. The proposal was rejected on April 10, 1962, by a sixty-three 
to fifty-nine vote. Two later attempts to revive the proposal, on April 26 and May 7, 
were likewise rejected. Id. at 2866-69, 3093. 
216. Id. at 2274 (exchanges between Messrs. Binkowski and Stevens); id. at 2867 
(exchanges between Messrs. Binkowski and Stevens). 
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brokers licensed by the Commission from engaging in discriminatory 
practices, was then before the courts.217 
The reasons why the "property owner's proposal" was repeatedly 
rejected by the convention, both before and after the approval of 
the civil rights commission provision, had nothing to do with the 
question of whether the convention intended to create novel rights 
protecting individuals from racial, religious, or ethnic discrimina-
tion in the private housing field. Some delegates thought the declara-
tion was unnecessary, being merely declaratory of existing law.218 
Others thought it unwise to forbid the legislature to delegate the 
power to limit rights of property owners. Still others questioned the 
proposal on technical or drafting grounds: Would it affect the power 
of the courts to determine property rights?219 Would it limit rather 
than expand the rights of property owners?220 What was a general 
law?221 Rejection of the proposal signifies only that the conven-
tion was content to leave the issue where it then was-in the hands 
of the legislature.222 
• Indeed, the history of the "property owner's proposal" provides 
further evidence that the convention did not intend to create new 
rights of nondiscrimination in private housing. The report accom-
panying the "property owner's proposal," which had been prepared 
by the Committee on Rights, Suffrage and Elections, supported the 
proposal on the following grounds: 
"This proposed new section in the declaration of rights is 
essentially declaratory in character. It creates a specific consti-
tutional guarantee of the long established principle of the 
common law whereby the individual, subject to the police 
power of the state, possesses a right to control the disposition of 
217. Repeated references were made to the effect of the property-owner's proposal 
on Rule 9. For the subsequent invalidation of Rule 9, see McKibbin v. Corporation 8: 
Sec. Comm'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d 557 (1963). 
218. See, e.g., 2 REcoRD 2282: "[I]f it is only declaratory of the common law, then 
why do we need it?" 
219. See Mr. Mahinske's comments and questions. Id. at 2275-76. 
220. See, e.g., id. at 2277 (Mr. Nord); id. at 2868 (Mr. A. G. Elliott: "The reason that 
I intend to vote against the amendments is that I'm afraid this limits the rights of the 
property owners in a way that we don't want ..• .'). 
221. E.g., id. at 2277. 
222. As Mrs. Hatcher stated, in explaining why she opposed any provision in the 
constitution dealing with racial discrimination in private housing: "The reason that 
I did not submit an amendment with reference to open occupancy and the freedom 
of the purchase of property by any citizen is because I feel that it is completely legisla• 
tive and it's a matter that the legislature should deal with. So for those reasons and 
many more that I do not care to state at this time, I seriously oppose the [property-
owner's proposal] •••• " Id. at 2868. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Hatcher, one of the 
group which had supported the Austin proposal, believed-after the adoption by the 
convention of the Civil Rights Commission provision-that racial discrimination in the 
private housing market had been left to the legislature. 
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his real property. The committee points out further that the 
provision is not at odds with the proposed civil rights section al-
ready reported to the floor. That section would require statutory 
enactment to authorize any infringement upon the right of con-
veyance in pursuance of civil rights guarantees and the present 
proposed section simply confirms that requirement in specific 
terms for real property. The prohibition upon legislative dele-
gation of the power to control or limit conveyance means that 
an administrative decree to that end, otherwise unauthorized 
by statute, would be in violation of the constitution."223 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Michigan Civil Rights Commission is an important, power-
ful agency that has substantial tasks to perform. But it does not 
possess plenary and exclusive power to formulate and implement 
social policy on all matters relating to race relations. The intent of 
the constitution-makers in this regard was an important but limited 
one: to establish a constitutional agency-self-executing in the sense 
that its existence and minimum powers were not dependent upon 
legislative action-which would assist in the enforcement of civil 
rights elsewhere created. Neither the framers nor the ratifiers evinced 
a purpose to effect a fundamental alteration in the legal order by 
creating enforceable rights and duties in the areas of private discrim-
inatory conduct. The constitutional language, viewed in the light of 
its history, does not permit such an interpretation. Although lan-
guage is a slippery tool, there are limits to manipulation by inter-
pretation; Humpty Dumpty was wrong when he said, "When I use 
a word ... it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor 
less." 
The Civil Rights Commission possesses authority to implement 
such civil rights as are specifically mentioned in the constitution, 
established by federal law, or specified and defined by state statute. 
The Commission does not have an unlimited power-free from 
democratic control through elected representatives of the people-
to create private rights and duties and to fashion remedial ma-
chinery. Indeed, the Commission possesses no substantive law-making 
power other than that incidental to the exercise of its judicial powers 
in the decision of individual cases; and even this power is subject 
to extensive judicial review. The legislature retains its traditional 
role as the major source of rights and duties which govern the 
relationships of private citizens. The courts must continue to define 
existing rights by the traditional process of interpretation, as con-
223. Id. at 2272. (Emphasis added.) 
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stitutional and statutory provisions come before them in contested 
cases. Nor does the constitution express an intent to bar other agen-
cies of government-executive officers, local governments, etc.-from 
acting to preserve existing or new civil rights of nondiscrimination. 
The long struggle for racial equality will not be served by accept-
ance of the position that the Civil Rights Commission has a monop-
oly of governmental power.The task is far too immense to be left 
to a single agency of government. The cooperation of all agencies of 
government-the legislature, the executive branch, the courts, and the 
local authorities-will be required to provide equal opportunity for 
all citizens. Under any view, there are serious limitations on the 
Commission's powers to act. The Commission will always be de-
pendent upon the legislature for financial support and additional 
powers. There is no assurance that the high quality of the present 
commissioners will be maintained and that the Commission will 
not come under the control of interested groups or of those who 
would use it for narrow political ends. Finally, the Commission's 
efforts may prove ineffective if its views on basic policy issues are too 
far in advance of public opinion or legislative sentiment. In a de-
mocracy the basic obligations of a private individual should be 
hammered out by the representatives of the people, not delivered 
from Olympus. 
The welfare of the state and the nation is deeply involved in the 
task of providing genuine equality of opportunity for all citizens. 
There is a grave danger that this grand objective may be impaired 
by exclusive reliance on a single administrative agency. The pur-
ported powers of the Civil Rights Commission provide excuses for 
legislative and local inaction in the civil rights field and may frus-
trate the efforts of the protest movement. It is to be hoped that a 
prompt and authoritative judicial resolution of the issues discussed 
in this article will end this period of paralysis. 
